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This Article proposes an unprecedented full statement of the legal defini-
tion of deceptiveness in advertising and other commercial speech. Defini-
tions available to date identify deceptiveness vaguely, in some respects
incorrectly, and in all respects far too briefly. A more complete definition
would reduce or eliminate the frequent disputes arising from these inade-
quate definitions.
When Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) or Lanham Act
deceptive advertising decisions are lengthy, the reason is almost always the
contentiousness involved in identifying what facts do and do not define de-
ceptiveness. Recently, the FTC's initial decision in Kraft, Inc.' devoted
forty-four of its seventy-two pages to disagreements over the validity of facts
about consumer perception of the challenged advertisements. Another four-
teen pages assessed similar disputes over facts about the product's features.2
Commission and respondent counsel defined differently these two essential
elements of deceptiveness, facts about consumer perception and product fea-
tures; they disagreed not merely over the facts established, but, more funda-
mentally, over the types of facts required.
This Article defines deceptiveness in detail sufficient to help eliminate such
misunderstandings. The resulting full definition includes only elements that
case law has already treated as part of the definition, although many of these
elements have not been formally identified as such. This Article also pro-
poses additions to the definition which accurately reflect the interdiscipli-
nary nature of deceptiveness both as a behavioral concept and a legal
concept. The definition calls for evidence about the communication as well
as the advertised product or service. Both types of evidence frequently in-
Ivan L. Preston is a Professor of Advertising, Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison. Ph.D.,
1964, M.A., 1961, Michigan St. Univ.; B.A., College of Wooster, 1953. Professor Preston is
the author of numerous law review and other articles on advertising law, a former FTC mar-
keting consultant and has served as an expert witness in FTC and State of Wisconsin advertis-
ing cases.
1. FTC Docket No. 9208 (Apr. 3, 1989) (initial decision, Commission opinion pending).
2. Id at 12-69.
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volve the study of what happens inside consumers' heads. Thus, the defini-
tion of deceptiveness proposed in this Article is based on consumer behavior
as well as on law, and its factfinding process represents a blending of the
expertise of both fields.
The additions suggested here reflect the best expert knowledge available
about consumers' perceptual responses to marketplace communications, and
about consumers' interpretations of product features. Incorporating these
additions would augment and improve, not discredit and abandon, the pre-
vailing definition. There would be no break with the past, but a smoother
flow into the future.
The FTC Act and the Lanham Trademark Act define deceptiveness
poorly, stating only that "deceptive acts or practices 3 or "any... false or
misleading description [or] representation of fact"4 are violations of the law.
More precise definitions emerge when an agency or court interprets those
phrases. Such interpretations provide definitional content explicitly or, in
the many instances when they do not identify it as such, implicitly. These
decisions provide a conceptual definition of deceptiveness, meaning that they
identify which consumer responses and product features indicate the pres-
ence of a violation. They also provide, although never labeling it as such, an
operational or measurement definition, meaning that they identify which
methods of measurement will validly indicate the presence of consumer re-
sponses and product features that might result in a violation. As a whole,
these interpretations and decisions create the "real" definition of deceptive-
ness, which is what this Article seeks to identify.
While case decisions frequently rewrite definitional elements on a piece-
meal basis, overall examinations of the topic are rare. Only recently has the
FTC incorporated the elements of the deceptiveness violation into a formal
definition. Before that, the FTC had identified the elements, but had not
conveniently packaged them into a single statement.5 The absence appar-
3. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
4. Act of Nov. 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125). The phrase prior to the 1988 amendments, which is applied in most of
the cases cited herein, was "false description or representation." Lanham Trademark Act,
§ 43(a), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946).
5. Until the 1970's, the most frequent FTC procedure was for the complaints to lay out
the elements one at a time and for the decisions to consider them one at a time. Sometimes an
opinion would not comment on a particular element, apparently taking it for granted. Other
times, an opinion would interpret an element, but without recourse to the overall definition.
Eventually, the decisions began including sections specifically discussing the legal framework
for the violation. Such comments were definitional, even though they usually did not explicitly
state a definition. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 58 (1972) (the court stated a "regulatory
framework" against which "the deception charge in this case must be viewed"). Among
others, see Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1493, 1523-26 (1974), modified on other
1036 (Vol. 39:1035
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ently was of no great import until 1983, when a Commission majority of
three led by Chairman Miller noted that "[n]umerous Commission and judi-
cial decisions have defined and elaborated on the phrase 'deceptive acts or
practices.' Nowhere, however, is there a single definitive statement."6
The Miller majority's interest in the definition stemmed from a desire to
change it.7 Two Commissioners dissented on the basis that the current defi-
nition was longstanding, and thus should remain unchanged. The dissent
held that the definition of a legally deceptive communication (reflecting the
topic of this Article, and more generally, any act or practice in or affecting
commerce) is one which has the tendency or capacity to deceive or mislead a
substantial number of consumers in a material respect.8
Chairman Miller defined a deceptive communication as one that is likely
to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances and is also
material.9 The actual differences involved in this new definition dwindled
grounds, 88 F.T.C. 210 (1976); ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 953-54 (1973).
The last such comment before the FTC stated a formal definition was in Bristol-Myers Co.,
102 F.T.C. 21, 319 (1983). In Lanham Act cases, a definitional framework was established in
Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. I11. 1974), which other courts
have cited frequently. See, e.g., U-Haul, Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1243
(D. Ariz. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1982); Ragold, Inc. v. Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc.,
506 F. Supp. 117, 124 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 251 (D.
Del. 1980).
6. Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 174 (1984) (letter dated Oct. 14, 1983 of FTC
Commissioner James C. Miller III to Representative John D. Dingell) [hereinafter Policy
Statement on Deception]. Might the term "definitive statement" have meant only an explana-
tory discussion rather than a definition? Id. at 174. In any event, the document provided
both.
7. For background on that effort and its results, see Dahringer & Johnson, The Federal
Trade Commission Redefinition of Deception and Public Policy Implications: Let the Buyer
Beware, 18 J. CONS. AFF. 326 (1984); Ford & Calfee, Recent Developments in FTC Policy on
Deception, 50 J. MARKETING 82 (1986); Comment, The Federal Trade Commission's Deception
Enforcement Policy, 35 DE PAUL L. REV. 125 (1985) [hereinafter Enforcement Policy]; Com-
ment, The FTC and Deceptive Trade Practices: A Reasonable Standard?, 35 EMORY L.J. 683
(1986); Comment, Trade Regulation - The FTC Policy Statement on Deception: A New Stan-
dard, or A Restatement of the Old?, 10 J. CORP. LAW 805 (1985) [hereinafter Trade Regula-
tion]; Note, The Need for a Statutory Definition of "Deceptive" Advertising, 19 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 127 (1983).
8. Analysis of the Law of Deception, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1154 at
372, 378 (March 1, 1984) [hereinafter Analysis] (enclosure by Bailey and Pertschuk in letter to
Representative John D. Dingell, Feb. 28, 1984). For an almost identical version, see Bailey &
Pertschuk, The Law of Deception. The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 849 (1984).
9. Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165-66 (1984). This is not quite the original from the
Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 174, but rather is the revision the majority
actually used in subsequent cases, beginning with Cliffdale. The original referred to being
likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances "to [their] detriment."
Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 176. The quoted portion was elaborated am-
biguously to mean either that consumers would be injured, which had not traditionally been a
1990] 1037
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once the majority was criticized for its apparent repudiation of the old defini-
tion.' ° Although the FTC now applies the Miller definition in consumer
cases, I" no litigated case has shown that the new standard makes a difference
in the outcome. 
12
In Lanham Act cases, which are brought privately by advertisers against
each other, the courts have attempted no parallel formal definition. The
statutory wording, however, is more detailed than the FTC's regulatory lan-
guage. The wording used until November, 1989, and thus applicable to the
Lanham Act cases cited herein, required that the false description or repre-
sentation apply only to the defendant's goods or services, and that it either
damage or be likely to damage the plaintiff.'" The new wording refers to
false or misleading descriptions or representations of fact which in commer-
cial advertising or promotion misrepresent any goods, services, or commer-
cial activities so as to damage or be likely to damage the plaintiff. 4
Readers may wonder whether the term "falsity" is defined the same way
in Lanham Act cases as in FTC cases. In one early Lanham Act case, the
court referred to "actually false" claims as a contrast to claims having a
definitional element, or that they would be likely to be injured, which was traditional. Id at
app. 182-83.
10. Protests that materiality should not be changed to mean actual injury resulted in the
revision in Cliffdale. See discussion in Ford & Calfee, supra note 7, at 85-86, 93-94. Ford and
Calfee call the definition as revised "a modest clarification and elevation of the standards,"
meaning that the new definition will be met less frequently and result in slightly less deception.
Id. at 100. Another commentator calls it "neither a restatement of the current case law nor a
totally new set of standards." Comment, Trade Regulation, supra note 7, at 815. Other com-
mentators, however, regard the changes as much more significant. See Dahringer & Johnson,
supra note 7, at 341; Comment, Enforcement Policy, supra note 7, at 159.
11. The FTC began using this definition in Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 110.
12. Commissioner Bailey's dissent in International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1077
(1984) (Bailey, Comm'r, concurring in part, dissenting in part), might be interpreted as an
attempt to distinguish, but her disagreement with the majority on this occasion was directed
toward other reasoning which she found novel and inappropriate. In a case decided at the
Commission level just before the new definition appeared, respondent asked an appellate court
to make the FTC apply the new standard rather than the old, probably hoping that the new
standard would make a deceptiveness finding less likely. The attempt was unsuccessful.
Amrep Corp. v. FTC, 768 F.2d 1171, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1034
(1986). Elsewhere, the Ninth Circuit said, "[w]e cannot accept petitioners' argument that a
'substantially different standard was applied, to which [they] had no opportunity to respond.'"
Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1431
(1986).
13. Lanham Trademark Act, § 43(a), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946);
see also Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. I11. 1974) (explaining
the statutory framework).
14. Act of Nov. 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125).
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"tendency to mislead, confuse or deceive."' 5 A "false description or repre-
sentation" as well as "words... tending falsely to describe or represent" a
product were used together in another case. 6 These usages may suggest
that Lanham Act decisions treat deceptiveness as one way, but not the only
way, to be false. This suggestion probably developed through the original
wording of the Lanham Act, which referred only to falsity,' 7 just the reverse
of the FTC's development of terminology in which actual falsity, in other
words, a false explicit claim, was one type of deceptiveness.' s
The difference between Lanham Act and FTC Act definitions of decep-
tiveness, however, has been in terms and not in actual concepts. The FTC's
two kinds of deceptiveness are without question the same as the Lanham
Act's two kinds of falsity. When forced to choose between terms, this au-
thor prefers the term deceptiveness because the FTC's use of deceptiveness is
older and is probably interpreted by most observers as a broader concept
than the Lanham Act's use of falsity.
The key to evaluating these definitions of deceptiveness is to realize that
they amount to no more than skeleton definitions, and do not attempt to
explain fully all of the elements actually required for a complete definition of
deceptiveness. Their incompleteness may be well motivated because they are
naturally appealing in their simplicity; the definitions are easily memorized
and quickly accessible to users in their brevity.
In the long run, however, simple definitions may result in offsetting disad-
vantages if observers think a topic is simple when actually it is quite com-
plex. To solve this problem, each conceptual and measurement element
actually used to define deceptiveness must be identified.
Although regulators use more than one definition of deceptiveness, this
Article refers only to a single definition because the two major definitions,
those of the FTC Act and the Lanham Act, are essentially similar. Consid-
erable differences exist in their procedural law; this Article, however, focuses
on substantive law. Therefore, this Article discusses the FTC Act and the
15. American Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
16. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785, 791
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Lanham Act, section 43(a)), aff'd, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978); see
also McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 543 (stating that court
will presume that false claims tend to mislead consumers, so proof of consumer perception is
unnecessary), modified on other grounds, 501 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Johnson & John-
son v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 740, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that the court will
consider implied messages which consumers take from advertisements), rev'd. 631 F.2d 186
(2d Cir. 1980).
17. See Lanham Trademark Act, § 43(a), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1946).
18. Infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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Lanham Act in tandem, and notes the occasional substantive differences be-
tween them.
The sovereign states also produce definitions of deceptiveness,' 9 but this
Article ignores these definitions because they are based largely on the na-
tional model of the FTC, which is usually pre-Miller. The definitions pro-
duced by individual jurisdictions vary only slightly. The advertising
industry's self-regulation apparatus is also a significant source of activity, but
its published decisions regarding deceptiveness provide too little detail to
allow the type of treatment given here.2'
The following sections identify the prevailing conceptual and measure-
ment elements used in defining deceptiveness and state a definition that ex-
plicitly incorporates all such elements. This Article then criticizes the
definition and suggests changes and additions. Finally, this Article proposes
an augmented definition that incorporates these suggestions.
I. How DECEPTIVENESS IS CURRENTLY DEFINED--
CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS
A. Claim Must be Commercial
Deceptiveness, as an exemption from the ordinary rights of freedom of
expression protected by the first amendment, 21 applies to commercial speech
only.22 Thus, determining whether speech is commercial or noncommercial
19. In 1981, the fiftieth state passed a version of the FTC Act. Comment, Enforcement
Policy, supra note 7, at 159 n.216. For discussions of state laws, see D. PRIDGEN, CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND THE LAW, chs. 3-6 (rev. 1989); J. SHELDON & G. ZWEIBEL, SURVEY OF
CONSUMER FRAUD LAW (1978).
20. Professor Best discusses self-regulation in detail, calling it one of "the three dominant
modes of contemporary advertising regulation." Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Com-
parative Study of Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L.
REV. 1, 71 (1985). Self-regulatory actions are reported in the NAD Case Report (available by
subscription from the Nat. Advertising Div., Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., 845
Third Ave., New York, NY 10022).
21. "The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informa-
tional function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful
activity." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (citation omitted).
22. FTC terminology considers acts or practices "in or affecting commerce" which
amended the FTC Act's original phrasing of "in commerce." See 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982)). The Lanham Act's original wording referred to
goods or services caused to "enter into commerce," and the 1989 amendment refers to "com-
mercial advertising or promotion" and to goods or services which a person "uses in com-
merce." See Lanham Trademark Act, § 43(a), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1946); Act of Nov. 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125); see also R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., FTC Docket No. 9206, 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,522 (Apr. 11, 1988) (where the FTC explained that "[u]nless the Reyn-
1040 [Vol. 39:1035
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is critical to the question of whether the FTC has jurisdiction to hear a
case.23 If the speech is noncommercial, the respondents avoid the issue of
deceptiveness.
Although commercialness is required under the Lanham Act as well as
the FTC Act, no Lanham Act cases have discussed the issue. Perhaps this is
because the Lanham Act requires demonstrating the likelihood of damage,24
which demands the existence of a commercial purpose.
B. Claim Must be Disseminated
The definition of deceptiveness requires that the challenged commercial
communication be disseminated. This sometimes means "widely dissemi-
nated,"25 which often happens with advertising; however, the FTC has
noted elsewhere that "Section 5 prohibits deception in advertisements which
are disseminated in a single publication or numerous periodicals... without
regard to whether the ad was published once by itself or several times."26
Thus, the necessary threshold for dissemination is far less than what often
occurs in national advertising. Of course, dissemination in the mass media is
not required for a salesperson's oral claim, which is typically stated only
within a place of business. Dissemination, therefore, need not be "wide" in
the sense of encompassing the entire nation or even a "large" audience.
Rather, dissemination must merely be wide enough to cause an agency or
court to conclude that the effect on consumers or defendants will be signifi-
cant."' The criterion is not defined more precisely.
C. Claim Must Consist of What is Conveyed
Perhaps the definition of deceptiveness is imprecise because the degree of
dissemination is not a critical element of the definition. Nor is deceptiveness
defined by what is literally communicated. Rather, the definition focuses on
olds advertisement could be classified as commercial speech, it was not subject to the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction").
23. Two respondents argued unsuccessfully in this way to avoid having their advertise-
ments judged on deceptiveness: R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,522; National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89 (1976), modified, 570 F.2d 157 (7th
Cir. 1977), modified order, 92 F.T.C. 848 (1978).
24. See discussion infra notes 52-53, 58, 103-04 and 113-19 and accompanying text.
25. Litton Indus., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1, 13 (1981). Although indicia of dissemination were
given, the phrase was not defined nor was any dispute over the matter evident.
26. Chrysler Corp., 87 F.T.C. 719, 751 (1976), modified on other grounds, 90 F.T.C. 606
(1977).
27. FTC complaints routinely charge, and decisions find, that Commission proceedings
and resulting orders are in the public interest. Lanham decisions find that defendants' actions
damage or are likely to damage. The opinions, however, never seem to link levels of dissemi-
nation to these matters explicitly.
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the claim conveyed to the consumer by the disseminated communication.
As the FTC explained long ago, "[t]here is no contest as to the wording of
the advertisements .... The contest is as to the meaning of the said adver-
tisements."2 Lanham Act cases recognized a similar interpretation of de-
ception: "[t]he question in such cases is - what does the person to whom
the advertisement is addressed find to be the message?"' 29 Under either the
FTC or the Lanham Act, the meaning must be determined on the basis of
the entire challenged advertisement or other communication.30 Where more
than one such communication is involved, the meaning must be determined
on the basis of each one separately."
Logically, then, the conveyed claim need not be stated explicitly in the
challenged communication; it may instead be implied.32 Proof establishing
28. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 49 F.T.C. 263, 282 (1952), aff'd, 348 U.S. 940 (1955); see also
American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981), enforced as modified on other grounds,
695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1983), modified on other grounds, 103 F.T.C. 528 (1984). "It is immate-
rial that the word 'established,' which was used in the complaint, generally did not appear in
the ads; the important consideration is the net impression conveyed to the public." Id. at 374.
29. American Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
30. For FTC Act cases, see American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d
Cir. 1982) (stating that the court should judge the advertisement as a whole); FTC v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963) (stating that courts should view the entire mosaic
to determine deceptiveness, rather than each tile separately); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165,
167 (7th Cir. 1942) ("Advertisements must be considered in their entirety, and as they would
be read by those to whom they appeal."); Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 176.
See generally Preston, Extrinsic Evidence in Federal Trade Commission Deceptiveness Cases,
1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 633, 675-76, 680-81 (1987) (analyzing an advertisement for decep-
tiveness involves viewing the advertisement in its entirety). For Lanham Act cases, see Vidal
Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating court should view
advertising in its entirety); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160,
165 n.ll (2d Cir. 1978) (same).
31. American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. at 414-15. See generally Preston, supra note
30, at 681 (when considering a number of advertisements together, the advertiser may be held
accountable for each individual advertisement as a separate violation). The point has not
arisen in Lanham cases.
32. For the FTC Act: "The ultimate impression upon the mind of the reader arises from
the sum total of not only what is said but also of all that is reasonably implied." Aronberg, 132
F.2d at 167. See generally Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 175 n.4 (misrepre-
sentations may be either express or implied); Analysis, supra note 8, at 382-83 (an implied
claim may arise from express statements regarding the performance or attributes of a product,
or from some innuendo conveyed by the advertisement as a whole); Preston, The Federal
Trade Commission's Identification of Implications as Constituting Deceptive Advertising, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1247-49 (1989) [hereinafter Preston, Implications] (express statements, as
well as reasonable implications, must be considered when analyzing a deceptive claim).
For the Lanham Act: "That Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act encompasses more than literal
falsehoods cannot be questioned." American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577
F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Preston, False or Deceptive Advertising Under the
Lanham Act: Analysis of Factual Findings and Types of Evidence, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 508,
1042 [Vol. 39:1035
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the truth of the explicit content does not conclusively rule out a finding of
deceptiveness,33 nor does the failure to be aware of an implication excuse the
advertiser.34 Implications may be based not only on what is conveyed but
also on what is omitted. 3 Identification of all implications, however, must
be reasonable.3 6
Until 1989, in Lanham Act cases, the challenged claim in the defendant's
communication had to be about the defendant's own product, although the
claim could also be about plaintiff's product if the claim was of comparative
form, thus mentioning both products.3 7 The rewording effective since 1989
513-14 (1989) [hereinafter Preston, Lanham Act] (advertisements may contain implied
meanings).
33. For the FTC Act: "Claims that are literally true may also be deceptive where the
overall impression communicated is misleading ...." Analysis, supra note 8, at 381; see also
Preston, Implications, supra note 32, at 1247 (if the net impression created by the advertise-
ment tends to mislead, then it is no defense that the express statements in the advertisement
are true). For the Lanham Act: "[Tihe plaintiff may show that, although the challenged
statement is ambiguous or literally true, the advertising is nonetheless misleading .... Amer-
ican Home Prods. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 522 F. Supp. 1035, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
34. For the FTC Act: Analysis, supra note 8, at 381 n.37 and accompanying text; FTC
Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, 48 Fed. Reg. 10471 (1983), reprinted
in Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. 648 app. at 839-40 (1984). Some commentators argue that
advertisers face an "intolerable" degree of uncertainty in recognizing what implications they
convey. Schmidt & Bums, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Proof or Conse-
quences: False Advertising and The Doctrine of Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1273,
1280 (1988). Another commentator disputes this point. Preston, Implications, supra note 32,
at 1243; see infra text accompanying notes 147-51.
Lanham Act cases have not explicitly stated that the failure to be aware of an implication
does not excuse the advertiser, but the same types of implications have been identified as in
FTC Act cases. Similarly, courts have rejected advertisers' protests about the nonexistence or
inapplicability of advertisements' implications. See generally Preston,.Lanham Act, supra note
32, at 513-26 ("Identifying implications as Lanham Act violations").
35. Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. at 176; Analysis supra note 8, at 383. For
discussions of the No Qualification Implication and the Ineffective Qualification Implication in
FTC Act cases, see Preston, Implications, supra note 32, at 1277-84. For Lanham Act cases,
see Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 516-18.
36. "This is not to say that an advertisement is susceptible to every reading that it may
technically support, no matter how tenuous it might be; rather, the interpretation must be
reasonable in light of the claims made in the advertisement, taken as a whole." Kroger Co., 98
F.T.C. 639, 728 (1981), modified on other grounds, 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982); see Policy Statement
on Deception, supra note 6, at 178; Analysis; supra note 8, at 392. The point has not arisen in
Lanham Act cases, probably because Lanham courts do not have the FTC's privilege of identi-
fying implications on the basis of the advertisement's content alone but rather must use extrin-
sic evidence. See discussion infra text accompanying note 86.
. 37. Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974). "A false
representation must be about Jartran's equipment, either standing alone or in comparison to
U-Haul's equipment." U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (D. Ariz.
1984), aff'd, rev'd, and modified in part, 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
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allows an action against a claim about either, and not necessarily both, the
defendant's or the plaintiff's product.38
D. Claim Must be Conveyed to Criterion of Consumers
To be legally defined as conveyed, a claim need not be conveyed to all
relevant consumers. Rather, the communication can convey two or more
claims, each to significant portions of the audience. Such a communication
can be a violation if one claim is deceptive, even if the remaining claim or
claims are not.39 Accordingly, the regulators must designate, in effect, a
criterion for the number of consumers acting reasonably, or more typically a
criterion percentage, and then find that the challenged claim has or has not
been found conveyed to that many.' Often, regulators do not do this explic-
itly, but they appear in virtually all cases to do so at least impliedly.
To describe the claim's conveyance in numerical terms tracks closely with
Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey's definitional element of a "substantial
number"41 and with the Lanham Act element of a "substantial segment"42
or "a not insubstantial number of consumers."4 3 It does not, however, re-
flect the Miller majority's now prevailing replacement element of "consum-
ers acting reasonably in the circumstances."' Chairman Miller's rationale
for this phrasing45 did not incorporate a numerical concept, and left the defi-
nition in dispute.'
Although the criterion percentages of consumers acting reasonably have
never been specified precisely, the number may be relatively small, as little as
38. The reference is to misrepresenting "his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities." Act of Nov. 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125).
39. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 178; Analysis, supra note 8, at 381-82;
Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 514.
40. Use of numbers ("many thousands") rather than percentages occurred in Travel
King, 86 F.T.C. 715, 759-60 (1975), but such usage is rare.
41, Analysis, supra note 8, at 387-94.
42, Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
43. McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 528, modified on
other grounds, 501 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This terminology has been used frequently.
See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568, 590
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (a "not insubstantial number").
44. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 176.
45. Id. at 177-82.
46. Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 185-88 (1984) (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting), 192-
95 (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting); Analysis, supra note 8, at 372, 391-94. That the discrepancy
is more apparent than real will be seen in this Article's discussion of how the new and old
elements are measured, which will augment the immediate discussion of how these elements




under fifteen percent in Lanham Act cases 4 7 and from twenty to twenty-five
percent at the FTC.48 The Pertschuk-Bailey minority would use the latter
range, holding the figures to reflect past practice and protesting the Miller
majority's statement. The minority argued that, despite the majority's si-
lence about such numbers, the majority opinion was open to the interpreta-
tion that the appropriate percentages, should percentages be used, would be
significantly larger than twenty to twenty-five.49 A higher figure would re-
duce the number of deceptiveness findings and comport with the reported
predilections of Reagan appointees to deregulate. Thus, the minority was
protesting not only that the majority was misdescribing the law, but also that
the majority was deregulating.
Nevertheless, of the nine litigated cases since the Miller definition was
installed, only two cases contain percentages, or even numbers. Both cases
include figures that are above the twenty to twenty-five percent level, thereby
supporting a finding of deceptiveness under either the old or the new defini-
tion.50 Thus, the post-Miller FTC record does not indicate that the criterion
percentages have changed.
Under either the old or the new definition, however, certain figures are
called too insignificant, even though considerable mystery accompanies the
process of determining the proper figure. 5 One reliable guideline is that the
47. Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(under 15% does not support a finding of deceptiveness), rev'd, 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir.
1982) (under 15% sufficient for a finding of deceptiveness).
48. Analysis, supra note 8, at 393-94 & nn.97-101.
49. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 184-85, 191 (Pertschuk, Bailey, Comm'rs, dissenting).
50. The seven decisions discussing no extrinsic evidence and making no other reference to
percentages included: Removatron Int'l Corp., FTC Docket No. 9200 (Nov. 4, 1988) (final
order), aff'd, 884 F.2d 1489 (1st Cir. 1989); North Am. Philips Corp., FTC Docket No. 9209
(Oct. 24, 1988) (final order); Figgie Int'l Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313 (1986); General Nutrition, Inc.,
FTC Docket No. 9175 (Feb. 2, 1986), consent order, 53 Fed. Reg. 9666 (1988); Southwest
Sunsites Inc., 105 F.T.C. 7 (1985), aff'd, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828
(1986); International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984); Cliffidale, 103 F.T.C. 110. In
Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987), reported percentages from consumer research included 23, 21,
35, and 30; 22% (compared pertinently to control percentages of 6 and 5); and 38 and 17%
(compared to control percentages of 5 and 1). Id. at 796, 805, 807. In Kraft, Inc., reported
percentages included 53, 47, 45, 33, 39, and 23. FTC Docket No. 9208 (Apr. 3, 1989) (initial
decision, Commission opinion pending).
51. Percentages less than 20 to 25% are not automatically too insignificant at the FTC,
but vague statements imply that some figures will be considered too small to support a finding
of deceptiveness. See Analysis, supra note 8, at 390; Preston, Implications, supra note 32, at
1250. For Lanham Act cases, the determinative inquiry focuses on whether a "not insubstan-
tial number of consumers were clearly misled." See Coca Cola, 690 F.2d at 317. See generally
Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 533 (where false claims create a danger to consumers,
the "not insubstantial number of consumers" standard, although vague, is applicable). "There
is no established quantitative measure of the degree ... " R. 1. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
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greater the potential harm, the smaller the minimum percentage. 52 None-
theless, the cases offer no insight as to whether the percentage is based on all
relevant consumers acting reasonably, on those to whom the message has
been disseminated, or on some other group.
E. Claim Must be Material, Factual, and False or Unsubstantiated
The claim conveyed to a criterion percentage of consumers must also be
material; it must be likely to affect consumers' choice of, or conduct regard-
ing, the promoted item. Presumably, for a false and material claim, the ef-
fect would be detrimental; however, the criterion is not the actual impact but
only the potential impact."
Once the claim is found to be conveyed and material, it must be found
false or unsubstantiated. As a starting point, the claim must be capable of
Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 867, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The decision then cited the
"not insubstantial" terminology and declared that "over 25%" met this test. Id. In con-
sumer behavior literature, finding the proper figure has been discussed as the "n percent prob-
lem." Jacoby & Small, The FDA Approach to Defining Misleading Advertising, 39 J. MKTG. 65,
67 (1975); Russo, Metcalf & Stephens, Identifying Misleading Advertising, 8 J. CONSUMER
RES. 119 (1981).
52. Some harm to consumers may involve physical injury or even death, while other harm
may be only the loss of a small sum spent in paying more than the lowest available price. For
FTC cases, see Analysis supra note 8, at 393. For Lanham Act cases, this guideline has not
been stated, no doubt because the harm in question is to plaintiffs rather than to consumers.
53. For FTC Act cases: see, e.g., Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 816; Cliffdale, 103
F.T.C. at 165. The Policy Statement on Deception gained notoriety for equating materiality
with actual injury. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 183 (1984). Nonetheless,
the Commission in all subsequent cases including those just cited fell back toward earlier un-
derstandings such as: "[A] misrepresentation may be material in affecting a buyer's choice even
though it does not relate to the product's quality or merits." FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
62 F.T.C. 1259, 1273 (1963), remanded, 326 F.2d 517 (1st Cir. 1963), rev'd and enforced, 380
U.S. 374 (1965). The Supreme Court upheld the point. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at
390. The newest expressions stress likelihood to affect, while the early ones stressed a weaker
potential to affect. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
For Lanham Act cases: the claim must be one that "is likely to influence the purchasing
decision." Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974). In Vidal
Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1981), defendants argued that the
claim was immaterial because it was based on tests of the product rather than the product's
inherent qualities. The court, however, pointing out that the statute referred to representa-
tions made "in connection with" the product, concluded in effect that test claims were mate-
rial: "[T]he medium of the consumer test truly becomes the message of inherent superiority."
Id. at 277-78.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act also states that the challenged claim must be one for which
plaintiff "is or is likely to be damaged." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The amended version is
the same as the earlier version except that the new language is gender neutral. Act of Nov. 16,
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
This element may appear related to materiality, but it involves the fate of the plaintiff whereas
materiality involves the fate of the consumer.
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being found true or false. Therefore, it must be factual. Puffery, the type of
opinion statement held to be accorded no factual meaning by consumers, is
thereby immune from being defined as deceptive.'
The product or service is then examined to determine whether the con-
veyed fact about it is true or false. Should the regulators fail to find the
claim false, they may sometimes establish that it cannot be found true,
either. In such a case, the regulators may charge that the claim lacks sub-
stantiation or a reasonable basis."
F. Claim Must be Considered Apart from Knowledge from Other Sources
and Must Damage or be Likely to Damage
When a conveyed claim is false or unsubstantiated, the consumer may
sometimes learn the truth before making a purchase, prompting the protest
that the claim was not, in the end, deceptive. The FTC's position on this
point, however, is that "it is well established that it is unfair to make an
initial contact or impression through a false or misleading representation,
even though before purchase the consumer is provided with the true facts.",
56
54. "The term 'puffing' refers generally to an expression of opinion not made as a repre-
sentation of fact." Wilmington Chem. Corp., 69 F.T.C. 828, 865 (1966). For other FTC char-
acterizations, see Policy Statement on Deception, supra at 181 (1984); Analysis, supra note 8, at
382. See generally Preston, Implications, supra note 32, at 1300 (section XX, "The Puffery
Implication"). For the Lanham Act approach, see definitions and discussions in Preston, Lan-
ham Act, supra note 32, at 521 (section 11, "Puffery Implication").
55. This author elsewhere created the combinatorial term of "RB/S" or reasonable basis/
substantiation representation following an analysis which showed that these two terms,
although originated separately, have at the FTC long since described the same phenomenon.
See Preston, Description and Analysis of FTC Order Provisions Resulting from References in
Advertising to Tests or Surveys, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 229, 253-54 (1987). A typical current
usage is that "[i]f the claims are not in fact substantiated, that is, supported by a reasonable
basis, the advertising may be found deceptive." Analysis, supra note 8, at 383.
While the lack of substantiation is an equally available and valid alternative to falsity in
FTC Act cases, courts are divided on these approaches in Lanham Act cases. See generally
Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 512 & n.19 (judicial decisions conflict as to whether
lack of substantiation alone, absent any showing that the claim is false or deceptive, is a viola-
tion of the act). Compare Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 253 (D. Del. 1980)
(lack of substantiation is not itself a violation) with Stiffel Co. v. Westwood Lighting Group,
658 F. Supp. 1103, 1111 (D.N.J. 1987) (lack of substantiation is itself a violation); see also
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 227-28 (3d Cir. 1990)
(plaintiff must show that advertisement is false or misleading and not just that the advertise-
ment is unsubstantiated). There is little basis available for speculation on when, if ever, this
discrepancy will be reconciled, or in which direction.
56. Chrysler Corp., 87 F.T.C. 719, 739, 751-52 (1976), modified on other grounds, 90
F.T.C. 606 (1977). See generally Analysis, supra note 8, at 385-86 n.56 and accompanying text
(once a deceptive practice has occurred, it may not be cured through subsequent disclosure of
the misleading information). There are no comments in Lanham Act cases on this point.
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Thus the impact of an advertisement is considered by itself: "Judge Hyun
correctly considered the net impression of individual advertisements and was
not required to consider the meaning of the claims in the context of the total
sales process.""7
Although falsity or lack of substantiation is the final element in FTC Act
cases, an additional definitional element in Lanham Act cases is that the
claim must damage or be likely to damage the plaintiff.58
G. Claim Need Not be Intended, Believed, nor Create Actual Deception
The absence of certain traditional elements in this definition of deceptive-
ness is noteworthy. Intent to deceive has been a requirement for proving
common law fraud since before the FTC was created, but intent need not be
proved by the Commission nor by Lanham Act plaintiffs. 9 In addition, the
consumer's actual belief need not be shown. A violation stems not from a
communication's actual deception, but rather from its deceptiveness, in
other words, its capacity or likelihood to deceive or mislead.' If the con-
57. Removatron Int'l Corp., FTC Docket No. 9200, slip op. at 6 (Nov. 4, 1988), aff'd,
884 F.2d 1489 (1st Cir. 1989).
58. See supra note 53.
59. For the FTC Act: "Intent to deceive is simply not an element of a deception under
Section 5." Travel King, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 715, 773 (1975). See generally Analysis, supra note 8,
No. at 381 (intent to engage in a potentially deceptive act is not a requirement). For the
Lanham Act: McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 529, modi-
fied on other grounds, 501 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Nor is proof of lack of intent a sufficient defense. For the FTC Act: "An advertiser's good
faith does not immunize it from responsibility for its misrepresentations ...." Chrysler v.
FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For the Lanham Act: Johnson & Johnson v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 1980).
Intent can play a role in determining what claim is conveyed, as discussed infra note 74 and
accompanying text. A point beyond this Article's topic is that evidence of intent can play a
role at the FTC in determining appropriate remedies. Analysis, supra note 8, at 381 n.37.
60. For the FTC Act: Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 176; Analysis,
supra note 8, at 380. For the Lanham Act: Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 251
(D. Del. 1980) (citing Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir.
1958)); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Il1. 1974). The distinc-
tion was made at the FTC to implement Congress' intent to prevent deception before it actu-
ally occurred, as acknowledged in the first appellate challenge to a Commission decision.
"IT]he legislative intent is apparent. The [C]ommissioners are not required to aver and prove
that any competitor has been damaged or that any purchaser has been deceived." Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
A recent article proposed nonetheless that actual deception be shown, according to the fol-
lowing definition. "An advertisement is legally deceptive if and only if it leaves some consum-
ers holding a false belief about a product, and the ad could be cost-effectively changed to
reduce the resulting injury." Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U.L. REV. 657,
678 (1985). For further development, see Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The
Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1991). That tack is not taken
here, because elimination of the need for the FTC to show actual belief has been so emphatic
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sumer sees a false or unsubstantiated claim conveyed, then legally the claim
is likely to deceive because it can be believed. Therefore, a violation exists
even without knowledge of whether belief actually occurs or is even likely to
occur.
H. The Conceptual Definition
Thus, a complete conceptual definition of deceptiveness would read as
follows:
When a claim is presented in a communication that is commercial
and is disseminated to some criterion6 1 of consumers, and the
claim, considered within the communication taken individually
and as a whole, is conveyed explicitly or impliedly to some crite-
rion proportion62 of relevant consumers, with or without intent to
deceive, with or without belief, with or without actual deception,
with or without consumers learning the truth prior to acting on it,
and the claim is factual, is material, is false or unsubstantiated, and
it damages or is likely to damage a plaintiff party, the claim is le-
gally deceptive.
The conceptual definition actually is more complex, though, because it im-
plicitly includes the definitions of its component terms ("commercial," ".ma-
terial," etc.) as discussed throughout this section.
II. How DECEPTIVENESS IS CURRENTLY DEFINED--MEASUREMENT
ELEMENTS
The definition just stated is more complete and informative than the skele-
ton definitions previously described. It has, however, been endowed only
with the relevant conceptual elements. Many people may choose to go no
further because the resulting definition is useful for abstract contemplation.
and well accepted. Cf infra text accompanying notes 121-39 (discussing the element of a
potential for belief).
The Miller definition was established in part on the argument that defining deception as the
"tendency and capacity to mislead or deceive" was "circular." Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 164 (1984). A principal purpose of using "tendency" or "capacity," however, is to make
the point that a violation is not necessarily based on an actual deception. The two concepts are
different, and the alleged circularity seems difficult to detect. Further, the substitute term
"likelihood" seems no more or less circular.
A point beyond this Article's topic is that one must prove actual deception to obtain dam-
ages in Lanham Act cases. Skil, 375 F. Supp. at 783. Pioof of actual deception is also re-
quired to obtain corrective advertising in either FTC Act or Lanham Act cases. See Toro, 499
F. Supp. at 254; Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 379-80 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
61. The use of the word "some" expresses that although the definition includes the crite-
rion, it does not specify what the criterion is.
62. See supra note 61.
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Nevertheless, for use in actual practice, a definition cannot be complete with-
out including the relevant operational or measurement elements. Without
the appropriate measurement method or test, one cannot identify conceptual
elements of the definition in concrete terms. Most of the definitional dis-
putes that occur focus on measurement methods or tests. Thus, determining
the measurement elements of deceptiveness is probably even more impor-
tant, albeit more difficult and uncertain, than determining the conceptual
elements.
It may seem odd to speak of "measuring" a communication in the case of
elements not customarily described in numerical terms, as for example in
determining whether a claim is factual or nonfactual. Measurement, how-
ever, is done not only in numerical scaling but also in nominal scaling con-
sisting of nominating observations into one category or another. A thing is
X or is not X, and in that sense every element of a definition is measured.
Accordingly, now that this Article has already defined the elements in con-
ceptual terms, it will define them in measurement terms.
A. Commercialness Must be Measured
In deciding whether a communication is commercial, the United States
Supreme Court has asserted that certain factors are not determinative.
The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertise-
ments clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are com-
mercial speech. Similarly, the reference to a specific product does
not by itself render the pamphlets commercial speech. Finally, the
fact that [the individual] has an economic motivation for mailing
the pamphlets would clearly be insufficient by itself. ....
The Court, however, added that the presence of all such factors in this in-
stance made the speech commercial."I
Recently, R. J. Reynolds argued that its advertising was noncommercial
and thus beyond FTC jurisdiction. The Commission observed that the
message itself may determine commerciality. Factors to consider include
whether the message is a paid advertisement, refers to a product (even if only
generically), discusses attributes of the product, and relates to the speaker's
economic or commercial motivation.6"
Thus, while most speech by commercial firms contains factors which
make it commercial, some speech by commercial firms may not be commer-
63. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 67.
65. R. J. Reynolds, FTC Docket No. 9206, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,522, 1 22,183-
87 (Apr. 11, 1988).
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cial.6 The determination involves an overall judgment as to the speech's
primary purpose; the primary purpose overrides the inclusion of some con-
tent that might on its own be noncommercial.6 The criteria as stated, how-
ever, are vague and difficult to apply to close cases.6"
B. Dissemination and Conveyance of the Claim Must be Measured
No FTC Act or Lanham Act case exists which (1) explicitly states a crite-
rion or assesses the extent of dissemination against any assumed criterion;
(2) focuses on a dispute over whether the dissemination met a criterion; or
(3) holds that the dissemination did not meet an assumed criterion.69 The
decisions usually include a summary of the extent of dissemination. 0 The
apparent criterion, however, is simply that there be some unspecified amount
of dissemination. Common sense seemingly demands that too little dissemi-
nation could sometimes occur, but such a possibility seems not to be present
on the record.
In order to identify conveyed claims and the percentages of people seeing
them conveyed, consumer researchers and regulators obtain data from con-
sumers. First, researchers and regulators must determine whether the con-
veyance is explicit or implied. The FTC is authorized to determine whether
a claim has been conveyed by looking at nothing but intrinsic evidence, in
other words, the literal communication alone.7' The FTC chooses to use
that method in the case of explicit claims for which "the representation itself
66. See Note, "New and Improved:" Procedural Safeguards for Distinguishing Commer-
cial from Noncommercial Speech. 88 COLUM. L. Rv. 1821, 1836-42 (1988).
67. "[C]ommercial speech [is] expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Sere. Comm'n., 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980). "mhe core notion of commercial speech [is] 'speech which does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction."' " Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. at 66 (quoting Virginia State Bd. Phar. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1975), quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)). If, in the course of doing so, it links a product to public issues or debate, it
may still be commercial. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5; see also Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (specific legal advice concerning Dalkon Shield
Litigation was allowed in attorney's advertisements).
68. See Note, supra note 66.
69. Criterion is discussed neither in the FTC majority's Policy Statement on Deception,
supra note 6, at 174, nor in the minority's Analysis, supra note 8, at 372.
70. Typically, at the FrC such data are summarized in the initial decision and not ap-
pealed to the Commission by either side. The summary includes such things as the media
used, the number of times and dates of exposure, and the total audience exposed.
71. See Preston, Data-free at the FTC? How the Federal Trade Commission Decides
Whether Extrinsic Evidence of Deception is Required, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 359 (1986).
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establishes the meaning. '  Courts also typically judge explicit claims under
the Lanham Act by intrinsic evidence alone.7 3 Thus, measuring the convey-
ance of explicit claims simply consists of finding claims in the communica-
tion and assuming that they are thereby conveyed into consumers' minds.
For implied claims, one must base the determination generally on certain
reasoning, although conveyance is assumed when evidence, which is typi-
cally unavailable, shows that the advertiser intended to convey an implied
meaning.74 The FTC's method of determining whether implied claims have
been conveyed depends on whether it can decide with confidence using in-
trinsic evidence alone. When such claims are easy to interpret, no other
evidence is necessary." In recognition that its interpretations must be rea-
sonable,76 however, the Commission requires extrinsic evidence when the
claims cannot be interpreted by relying on intrinsic evidence alone."
For those easily interpreted implicit claims, the FTC now decides, consis-
tent with the new Miller definition, how consumers acting reasonably would
interpret the communication."' This definition replaces the old definition,
which required that a substantial proportion of consumers see the advertise-
72. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 176. Thompson Medical Co., 104
F.T.C. 648, 789 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086
(1987).
73. American Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
74. For the FTC Act: "An interpretation will be presumed reasonable if it is the one the
respondent intended to convey." Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 178. For the
Lanham Act: "[P]roof that the advertiser intended to communicate a false or misleading
claim is evidence that that claim was communicated, since it must be assumed that more often
than not advertisements successfully project the messages they are intended to project, espe-
cially when they are professionally designed .... ." McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 530, modified on other grounds, 501 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
75. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 176; Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C.
at 789.
76. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78. Although the original Miller reference was to "reasonable consumers," the change
was quickly made to refer to "consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances." The
latter reference is variously described as involving consumers making reasonable interpreta-
tions or involving messages that can reasonably be interpreted as being conveyed. See Figgie
Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313, 374 (1986); International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1056-57
(1984); Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 788, 790, 791, 797; Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C. 110,
165 (1984).
The term "reasonable consumers" sometimes still appears. See, e.g., Thompson Medical,
104 F.T.C. at 812. The sum of the various usages and the overall context in which they ap-
pear, however, suggests that the term no longer refers solely to those consumers who act rea-
sonably in the sense that the Policy Statement originally put it. Instead, "[t]his element
focuses only on the interpretation of a claim. We do not inquire further and consider the
reasonableness of the consumer's decision to accept or believe in a particular claim." Interna-
tional Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1056 n.21. "Consumers acting reasonably under the circum-
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ment conveying the claim.7 9 Presumably, the change should make a differ-
ence. Nevertheless, in practice it is impossible to discern a change because
the measurements used in the two cases are not identifiably different.
No explanation of how one defines a consumer acting reasonably is given
in FTC decisions today, just as no explanation of how one defined a substan-
tial proportion was given in the past. Nor have the cases decided under the
Miller definition produced any comments suggesting that some claims found
conveyed under the old definition would be found not conveyed under the
new one.
80
Therefore, for easily interpreted implied claims, the measurement defini-
tion of conveyance is that conveyance occurs when a majority of Commis-
sioners says it occurs for consumers acting reasonably, as determined by
examining the advertisement. The Commission's reasoning is often not ex-
plained, and when it is, no standardized criterion is invoked.
When the Commission considers implied claims about which it cannot
decide with confidence, the Commission insists on extrinsic evidence, that is,
evidence of consumers' perceptions apart from the communication itself."1
This requirement allows the Commission to avoid otherwise arbitrary opin-
ions. One may note, however, that the Commission itself decides its own
level of confidence. Should the Commission wish in a certain case to deter-
mine deceptiveness without examining consumer response, it need only
claim it can do so confidently. Thus it really has not eliminated the possibil-
ity of making arbitrary opinions, although it has created a possible mecha-
nism for self-restraint.
A commitment which the Commissioners cannot escape is that they must
consider extrinsic evidence that has been introduced into the record. 2 Such
evidence may, however, be assessed as having greater or lesser probative
value.83 When extrinsic evidence has probative value, its role is to supple-
stances are those who have acted in a way consistent with the broad range of ordinary or
average people." Id. at 1057.
79. The old definition was rejected: "The Commission, however, will not require evidence
that a claim has been interpreted in a certain way by some threshold number of consumers."
International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1057.
80. See supra text accompanying note 49 (critics of the Miller definition warned that the
new definition was a deregulatory tool).
81. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 789.
82. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 588 (D.C. Cir.
1970). "Because Thompson offered extrinsic evidence, we are obliged to consider it." Thomp-
son Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 794. See generally Preston, supra note 71, at 366-69 (distinguishing
between situations where the FTC is required to allow extrinsic evidence and situations where
the FTC must have extrinsic evidence to decide the cases).
83. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 454 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); see also Preston, supra note 71, at 366-68 (the rule
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ment rather than to replace the Commission's own expertise.14 This role
largely transforms the process of identifying deceptiveness into an interdisci-
plinary blending of legal and consumer behavior expertise.
When the extrinsic evidence consists of probative consumer surveys, the
Commission's current assertion that it is applying the new Miller definitionas
is cast into doubt because the survey evidence inevitably produces the type of
percentage figure indicated by the old definition in calling for a substantial
proportion. Thus, while the conceptual element of the definition involves no
explicit reference to numbers or a numerical criterion, the measurement ele-
ment does. In such cases, the measurement element provides the actual defi-
nition because it identifies the decision steps the definer actually uses.
The Lanham Act procedure differs from the FTC Act procedure in that
the Lanham Act requires extrinsic evidence for all implied claims.86 Such
evidence does not have to be obtained directly from consumers, but must go
beyond looking at just the communication by examining consumer response
at least indirectly. 7 As at the FTC, such evidence is not absolutely determi-
native, but, under the Lanham Act, it plays a more prominent role than at
the Commission.8"
The major types of extrinsic evidence are consumer surveys and expert
testimony. Both FTC Act and Lanham Act proceedings have stringent re-
quirements for surveys, mostly because opposing lawyers have learned ways
to criticize standard copytesting, such as day-after-recall or theater testing.
When acceptably rigorous, such surveying of consumers is the best extrinsic
evidence, and theater testing is the best kind of surveying. The only other
kind of extrinsic evidence often used is expert testimony; however, when ex-
perts testify nakedly, that is, without consumer data on the precise commu-
nication under challenge, they do poorly. Other sources of extrinsic
requiring the ALJ to admit extrinsic evidence has minor implications because the AJ is free
to disregard the evidence if it is of low probative value).
84. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1493, 1540 (1974), modified on other
grounds, 88 F.T.C. 210 (1976). See generally Preston, supra note 30, at 637-40 (extrinsic evi-
dence is used to support, corroborate, or confirm independent FTC determinations).
85. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
86. American Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). See generally Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 526-28 (the distinction
between explicit claims and implied claims requires resort to extrinsic evidence to demonstrate
the deceptive effects of the otherwise accurate statements).
87. Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 529.
88. "[W]e do not have the same expertise as the Federal Trade Commission .... Accord-
ingly, we, as judges, must rely more heavily on the reactions of consumers ...." American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 172 n.27 (2d Cir. 1978). Preston,
Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 527.
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evidence, such as textbooks or dictionary definitions, have value, but are not
used frequently. 9
One point, however, deserves mention for its insight into how well the
new Miller definition prevails over the old in actual FTC practice. Decisions
involving consumer surveys in both FTC Act and Lanham Act cases have
held that, for determining conveyed meanings, there is no need for samples
to: (1) be national probability samples; (2) include only those who use the
product or have characteristics indicating the probability of such usage; or
(3) include only those exposed to the media running the advertisement. 90
The explanation is that the sheer perception of what a message is saying
should not differ from one sort of person to another, although the reverse
might be true for such things as opinions, beliefs, and actual purchasing. 91
The relevance to the Miller definition is that the resulting samples encom-
pass more than just those consumers acting reasonably under the circum-
stances. Consumers exhibiting any degree of reasonableness or
unreasonableness may be included, which in practice comprises all
consumers.
92
To summarize a lengthy discussion, a claim conveyed to a criterion of
consumers occurs: (1) when FTC Commissioners or Lanham judges find
that explicit claims are in the communication or that implied claims were
intended to be made; (2) when FTC Commissioners find, using unspecified
reasoning with no criteria, (a) that implied claims are easy to identify based
on examining the communication, and that such claims have occurred for
consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances; or (b) that implied claims
are hard to identify, but also find by using probative extrinsic evidence93 that
they have been made impliedly to consumers generally without regard for
reasonable or unreasonable persons, users or nonusers, exposed or nonex-
89. Preston, supra note 30, at 637-71; Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 526-37.
90. See discussions in Preston, supra note 30, at 654-55; Preston, Lanham Act, supra note
32, at 534; see also Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 792 n.15 (1984) (a reasonable
consumer is an ordinary member of the target audience), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).
91. This author feels from generalized knowledge of the research literature that a signifi-
cant proportion of consumer researchers may not be fully satisfied with this conclusion. In the
FTC Act and Lanham Act records to date, however, this conclusion stands as stated.
92. The only way to conclude anything about consumers acting reasonably is to decide
that a percentage below a specified criterion indicates that only unreasonable consumers per-
ceived the message, while a percentage above indicates that a significant number of reasonable
consumers, among others, perceived the message. This amounts to a reversion to the earlier
"substantial proportion" definition, causing the definition of "consumers acting reasonably" to
be measured and defined in practice as nothing more than a percentage meeting a criterion.
93. Theater testing is the most likely to be probative, followed by other surveys, then by
expert testimony, and finally by infrequently used miscellaneous sources.
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posed persons, or other types of consumers, to a criterion percentage that
will vary but is likely to be specified as about twenty to twenty-five percent
or more; or (3) when Lanham Act judges find by similar extrinsic evidence
that implied claims have occurred for a not insubstantial segment that will
vary but is likely to be specified as about fifteen percent or more.
C. Materiality Must be Measured
FTC Commissioners and Lanham Act judges generally determine
whether a claim is material simply by looking at the communication. By
fiat, the FTC presumes that explicit claims, intended implied claims, and
unintended implied claims about the product's central characteristics are
material.94 More broadly, the FTC presumes that substantive claims are
made to affect consumers' choices about a product, and "[t]hus, the very
existence of the claim ordinarily is sufficient evidence for us to conclude it is
material."95
Such conclusions are not enforced arbitrarily, because the
respondent is always free to counter this evidence either with argu-
ments pertaining to the content of the ad itself or with extrinsic
evidence. Moreover, the presumption does not preclude us from
exercising our own judgment and concluding from evidence in the
advertisement (or extrinsic evidence) that a claim is not material
even if the respondent does not dispute materiality.96
Thompson Medical Co.,97 for example, used extrinsic evidence by offering
an advertising agency executive's opinion that aspirin content was material
only for internally taken products because consumers treat rub-on pain re-
lievers such as the company's own Aspercreme less seriously than internally
ingested products.9" Alternate research, however, showed that thirty-nine
percent of consumers and fifty-three percent of arthritis sufferers preferred
aspirin over non-aspirin pain relievers.99 Ruling that this finding contra-
vened the opinion, the FTC found it material to claim that Aspercreme con-
94. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313, 379 (1986); International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C.
949, 1057 (1984); Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 816-17; Policy Statement on Deception,
supra note 6, at 182. Central characteristics include the purpose, safety, healthfulness, efficacy,
cost, durability, performance, warranties, or quality of the advertised item. Policy Statement
on Deception, supra note 6, at 182-83.
95. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 816 n.45.
96. Id. "The Commission will always consider relevant evidence offered to rebut such
presumptions of materiality ...." Figgie, 107 F.T.C. at 379.
97. 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1086 (1987).




tained aspirin." Extrinsic evidence played similar roles in other cases,"° I
and an independent researcher has devised a survey method to determine
materiality."°2 Nevertheless, in the great majority of FTC Act cases, neither
side has offered extrinsic evidence on materiality, and respondents have not
opposed the Commission's findings.
Parties rarely dispute the finding of materiality in Lanham Act cases,
103
probably because damages or their likelihood must also be proven. Unless
damages are proven, the plaintiff's position fails and materiality does not
matter. On the other hand, if the plaintiff proves damages, materiality fol-
lows from the presumption that the plaintiff could not suffer injury unless
the misrepresentation affected consumers' purchasing decisions."°
D. Factuality and Truth or Substantiation Must be Measured
Determining whether a claim is factual or nonfactual entails deciding
whether or not the claim is capable of being found true or false. As the
Commission stated in Pfizer, Inc.,1"5 "[t]here is a category of advertising
themes, in the nature of puffing or other hyperbole, which do not amount to
the type of affirmative product claims for which either the Commission or
100. Id. at 707-08, 817.
101. The FTC deemed material a claim that Listerine was "'effective for colds and sore
throats.'" This conclusion was based on survey evidence that the claim was "'extremely im-
portant'" in choosing a mouthwash to 37.5% of consumers interviewed over seven years.
Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1504 (1975), modified on other grounds, 562 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). Materiality was established in part
through testimony of individual consumers. North Amer. Philips Corp., FTC Docket No.
9209, slip op. at 29-30 F. 168-79 (Oct. 24, 1988). Economic evidence, such as pricing, can also
indicate materiality. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 183 & n.57 (citing Amer-
ican Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 369 (1981)).
In Kraft, Inc., Kraft claimed only 1.6% of surveyed consumers listed calcium as a reason for
buying its Singles cheese slices, thus making calcium claims not material. That figure is much
lower than the figure for Thompson Medical, or for Warner-Lambert. In addition, calcium was
rated seventh or eighth in importance among the nine surveyed reasons for buying the product.
The survey, however, merely asked consumers questions about calcium and did not show them
the advertisement containing the calcium claims. The judge found materiality. Kraft, Inc.,
FTC Docket No. 9208, slip op. at 45-48, 70-71 (Apr. 3, 1989) (initial decision, Commission
opinion pending).
102. J. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING: BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LEGAL CON-
CEPT 164 (1990). Based on dissertation done under the direction of this author.
103. There appears to be only one case: Borden, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
811 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1984). Therein, the defendant argued immateriality, but the court
worded ambiguously its finding of no actionable misrepresentation, meaning either that the
claim was not material or that it was not false. Id. at 819. See discussion in Preston, Lanham
Act, supra note 32, at 551-52.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 113-19 (discussion on measuring damages).
105. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
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the consumer would expect documentation. '' "°6 The regulators do not de-
termine truth or substantiation for such claims.
The measurement definition of whether material and factual conveyed
claims are true or false, or substantiated or unsubstantiated, has been ad-
vanced to highly sophisticated levels in recent cases. Nevertheless, the defi-
nition begins with the simplest of propositions - whether the advertised
item's characteristics are as claimed. If the product is factually consistent
with the claim, the claim is true; if the product is factually contradictory, the
claim is false. In many instances, regulators or anyone else can ascertain
with the naked eye, with other sense organs, or by routine questioning, fact
gathering, or reasoning whether the claim is consistent with the product.° 7
In other instances, only experts in the given field can determine whether a
claim is true, and often can do so only with the aid of professional instru-
ments, product tests, or consumer response surveys.1 °8 A typical summary
of the regulators' expectations is that the false conveyed claim is prohibited:
unless at the time of such representation respondent possesses and
relies upon a reasonable basis for such representation, consisting of
competent and reliable evidence which substantiates such represen-
tation; provided, however, that to the extent such evidence consists
of any test, experiment, analysis, research, study or other evidence
based on the expertise of any professional, such evidence shall be
"competent and reliable" only if... conducted and evaluated in an
objective manner by a person qualified to do so, using procedures
generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable
results. 109
106. Id. at 64. For the FTC Act: see generally Policy Statement on Deception, supra note
6, at 181 (obvious exaggerations, such as those statements that ordinary consumers would not
take seriously, will not be pursued by the Commission); Analysis, supra note 8, at 382 (puffing,
obvious exaggerations, and subjective opinions normally do not mislead the public); Preston,
Implications, supra note 32, at 1300-06 (arguing that the FTC should not apply the "puffery
implication" as an exception in all cases, but instead, should analyze each case on its own facts
in light of extrinsic evidence). For the Lanham Act: see Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32,
at 521-22.
107. For example, a complaint charged that an item advertised for sale was not available
for public purchase. Although the consent settlement involved no admission of a violation, the
FTC could not have found the fact of availability hard to determine. Commodore Bus. Ma-
chines, Inc., 105 F.T.C. 230 (1985).
108. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 55 (a survey of FTC cases concerning misrepresentations
of surveys and tests in advertisements), Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 544-51 (section
IX. "Determining the Truth of the Conveyed Meaning"). Because these sources have detailed
extensively the appropriate requirements specified in many FTC Act and Lanham Act deci-
sions, the requirements are not detailed here.
109. Blue Lustre Home Care Prods., Inc., 108 F.T.C. 41, 49 (1986) (emphasis in original).
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One factor underlying such a requirement is that advertisers frequently
have evidence that they claim is sufficient to prove the truth of the conveyed
claim, but which is insufficient because it is not competent and reliable to the
required degree. 1° In many cases, evidence has been found irrelevant for
determining the required facts.' 1 ' Such decisions show that the mere provi-
sion per se of evidence is not enough; evidence must establish the facts." 2
Such evidence need not be more sophisticated nor scientific than necessary
for the type of claim involved, but it must be no less.
E. Damage or its Likelihood Must be Measured
Upon being required to demonstrate actual or likely damages, Lanham
Act plaintiffs usually opt for the lesser showing of likelihood. 1 3 The latter
standard will not be presumed, however, it must be demonstrated. 14 The
plaintiff may meet the requirement by measuring either the actual or likely
direct diversion of sales from the plaintiff to the defendant, or the actual or
likely reduction of goodwill that the plaintiff's product enjoys with the buy-
ing public.'1 ' In one case, actual lost sales were shown by a loss of six per-
cent in market share, 116 and in another by losses in both market share and
revenue by the plaintiff along with gains by defendant." 7 Actual loss of
goodwill does not appear to have been found in any cases.
Likely lost sales have been inferred from findings of statements that tend
falsely to make the defendant's product appear superior to the plaintiff's
because these statements will cause consumers to shift purchases from the
110. An example occurs in Cliffdale Associates in which, inter alia, product testing by
consumers was found unscientific due to its lack of appropriate controls. 103 F.T.C. 110, 143,
168-69 (1984). A similar finding in a Lanham Act case was in American Home Prods. Corp.
v. Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.
1978).
111. The term often used is "nonequivalent" or "lacking equivalence." See, e.g., Preston,
supra note 55, at 287-89, 292, 295-98 (giving examples of advertisements where claims were
not supported by the test or study used); Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 545-51 (exam-
ples of improper claims based on ineffective uses of comparative preference tests, clinical tests,
and physical feature tests).
112. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 55, at 287-89, 292, 295-98; Preston, Lanham Act, supra
note 32, at 545-51.
113. See U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1255 (D. Ariz. 1981) (stat-
ing that "[p]roof of actual injury is difficult to demonstrate"), aff'd, 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir.
1982).
114. Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1980).
115. Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
116. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 522 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
117. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd,
modified, rev'd in part, 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
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plaintiff to the defendant. 1l Thus, where the element of falsity is first satis-
fled, the finding of likely lost sales is apparently presumed and need not be
separately measured. Likely loss of goodwill could similarly be inferred. 119
Cases have not discussed whether the same presumptions apply when the
lack of substantiation is recognized as an alternative to falsity.
All definitional elements, both conceptual and measurement, have now
been examined, and are ready to be summarized. The reader should note
that in the following discussion some definitional elements refer to the claim
and some to the communication that contains the claim.
III. THE CURRENT DEFINITION OF DECEPTIVENESS
This combined conceptual and measurement definition should be inter-
preted as including implicitly the definitions of all component elements dis-
cussed above. All elements in the definition are actually applied by the
regulators; this author contributes only by summarizing them in a single
statement for the first time. The elements are defined as precisely as the
record specifies, which, in some cases, means quite imprecisely. All elements
are subject to future change. The definition is:
When a claim is presented in a communication that is commer-
cial, because the communication has factors that include being
paid for, and/or being about a commercial item (even if only im-
pliedly), and/or discussing the attributes of that commercial item,
and/or supporting the speaker's economic motives, and which fac-
tors, despite the presence of noncommercial content, lead to a con-
clusion that the communication's primary purpose is commercial;
and the communication is disseminated to consumers, to a crite-
rion of unspecified amount or degree;
and the claim, considered within the communication taken indi-
vidually and as a whole, is found conveyed, via one of several
processes, including:
(1) by FTC Commissioners or Lanham Act judges finding that
claims are made explicitly on examining the communication (in-
trinsic evidence) or that implied claims were intended to be made;
or
(2) (a) by FTC Commissioners finding that claims made impliedly
are easy to identify as such and so finding by usually unspecified
and criterionless reasoning based on examining the communication
118. Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
119. "[I]t is difficult to believe that, over the long run, continued claims of competitive
superiority would not eventually detract from a competitor's sales and goodwill." McNeilab,
Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 539-40, modified on other grounds,
501 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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(intrinsic evidence) that such claims have been conveyed to con-
sumers acting reasonably in the circumstances; or
(2) (b) by FTC Commissioners finding that claims made impliedly
are hard to identify as such but further finding by examining con-
sumer response (extrinsic evidence, of which theater testing is most
likely to be probative, followed by other surveys, then by expert
testimony, and finally by infrequently used miscellaneous sources)
that the claims have been conveyed to consumers generally (that is,
without regard for reasonable or unreasonable persons, users or
nonusers, exposed persons or nonexposed, or other types of con-
sumers), to a criterion percentage that will vary but is likely to be
specified as approximately twenty to twenty-five percent or more;
or
(3) by Lanham Act judges finding by similar extrinsic evidence
that implied claims have been conveyed to a not insubstantial seg-
ment that will vary but is likely to be specified as approximately
fifteen percent or more;
and the claim is conveyed with or without evidence of intent to
deceive, with or without evidence of belief, with or without evi-
dence of actual deception, with or without evidence of consumers
learning the truth prior to acting on it;
and the claim is material, that is, having the potential to affect
consumers' purchasing decisions, either by being explicitly stated,
or intended to be conveyed impliedly, or describing impliedly even
though unintendedly the advertised item's central characteristics,
or for other possible reasons relating to affecting consumers'
purchasing decisions, such findings being made on the basis of at
least intrinsic evidence, subject to rebuttal in FTC Act cases by
extrinsic evidence of consumers' relevant perceptions;
and the claim is factual, as determined through reasoning that it
is capable of being found true or false;
and the claim is false or unsubstantiated, by being found discon-
firmed or not confirmed by the facts of the promoted item, as de-
termined by an objective observation method appropriate to the
item, ranging from the use of any observer's unassisted sense or-
gans to the competent use by qualified experts of scientific mea-
surement instruments or methods generally accepted in the given
field;
and, in Lanham Act cases, the claim damages plaintiff as indi-
cated by its loss and/or defendant's gain of market share or reve-
nue, or is likely to damage plaintiff through loss of sales or
lessening of goodwill as indicated by existence of a claim giving a
false perception of the relative superiority of plaintiff's and defend-
ant's products;
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the claim is legally deceptive.
This statement is offered as superior to the previous skeleton definitions.
It contains no new elements and draws everything from the existing record.
What is original is that a complete definition of deceptiveness is now stated
explicitly rather than only impliedly. In particular, measurement elements
take their place along with the conceptual elements as essential components
of the total definition. The result is hard to commit to memory and offers
none of the advantages of the customary brief sentence definition. The defi-
nition's only virtue is that it tells more.
IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE DEFINITION
With all of the definition's actual elements in place, the discussion now
turns to what might be changed or added. This section criticizes conceptual
and measurement elements in the current definition and proposes a new ele-
ment. The purpose of the suggestions is not, as others have attempted, to
write a new definition. 120 Rather, the purpose is to make the current defini-
tion more logical and complete.
A. Consumer Belief of the Conveyed Claim Could be Considered
An element that might be added to the definition is consumer belief of the
conveyed claim - not actual belief, which is not required, 2' but rather the
potential for belief.'22 Under this element, the central issue is whether a
conveyed claim can reasonably be called likely to deceive even if it is found
unlikely to be believed. A more acceptable concept might be that the con-
veyed claim have the potential to deceive if believed; thus, the potential to
deceive exists only to the extent that the potential for belief exists. When the
regulators look at what is conveyed, and not at whether the claim is believa-
120. Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, supra note 60; Schechter, The Death of
the Gullible Consumer: Towards a More Sensible Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 571 (1989).
121. See discussion supra note 60 and accompanying text. The definitions offered by Cras-
well, and by Russo, Metcalf, & Stephens, supra note 51, involve actual belief and essentially
would produce a new definition which is not attempted here.
122. PRESTON, Research on Deceptive Advertising: Commentary, 13 INFORMATION
PROCESSING RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING, at 294-98 (R. Harris, ed. 1983). Another new ele-
ment, "likely to act," is offered by Schechter, supra note 120, at 612-18. After equating it
conceptually with actual belief, he offers surrogate measurement elements. Id As stated ear-
lier regarding Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, supra note 60, the proposal appears
to involve a new definition of deceptiveness rather than an improved one.
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ble, they may find that the capacity for deception exists in instances where it
simply does not exist.
123
An instructive example occurred in American Home Products Corp. v. Ab-
bott Laboratories,124 where a claim that a drug "'stops pain immedi-
ately' ,125 was found to convey to consumers that the pain would really end,
not just decrease very soon. The court, noting that many consumers called
such meaning false, held that "consumer disbelief... may reduce the injury
caused ... , 26  The court concluded, however, that "skepticism, or
whatever is at work, does not affect the meaning itself or the fact that the
meaning was conveyed."'
127
Although the court may have meant that nonskeptical consumers could
believe the claim, and thus could be injured, the net impression seems to be
that, despite strong contrary evidence, the mere conveyance of a message
causes a likeliness of injury because the message might be believed. 128 What
is missing is the reasonable observation that the potential to injure is inher-
ent in the false conveyance only when there is a potential for belief. Further,
while the potential for belief might reasonably be presumed from the convey-
ance, it might reasonably be found absent in some cases.
A recent test for the presence or absence of belief came in a copytesting
study of advertisements from actual FTC Act cases in which questions were
asked about What was conveyed and whether the surveyed persons believed
the message. 129 The Commission found that consumers believed several of
123. The Commission in International Harvester commented on why belief is not ex-
amined. "In view of deception's unalloyed negative qualities, the three elements of the decep-
tion analysis represent streamlined procedures adopted by the Commission to deal most
effectively with such practices.... [A]s one instance of streamlining, we do not go beyond
likelihood to require evidence on the incidence of actual false belief." 104 F.T.C. 949, 1056
(1984). While the value of streamlining is not insignificant, it might well be overshadowed in
this instance by other factors discussed herein.
124. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
125. Id. at 1045.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Another Lanham Act decision stated that "these tests provide sufficient evidence of a
risk of irreparable harm because they demonstrate that a significant number of consumers
would be likely to be misled." Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d
Cir. 1982). Actually, the copy tests showed only which claims were conveyed, and provided
no evidence concerning whether they might be or were believed, without which they could not
be found to mislead. "The jury's conclusion that consumers actually were deceived ... is
supported by the false advertising contained on the record albums and the fact that Audi-
ofidelity successfully sold the albums on the market." PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity En-
ters., Inc., 818 F.2d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 1987). Although such a conclusion might reasonably be
presumed in certain contexts, the two facts cited certainly do not prove that consumers actu-
ally were deceived.
129. RICHARDS, supra note 102, at 146-77.
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the conveyed claims that were challenged, but they disbelieved other claims.
The latter claims thus appeared to have no potential for harm. Therefore,
advertisements with similar abilities to convey falsity differed in their poten-
tial for harm.
In a rare reflection of such considerations, one court recognized that:
today's newspapers, magazines and other forms of advertisement
are rife with the message of low tar content in cigarettes, and [we]
find that because of such profusion it is substantially less likely that
any reader having an interest in the subject will be misled by the
messages before us .... Readers who do not have an interest may
be misled but are unlikely to be consumers.
130
Regulators apparently are also responsive to spoofs or joke advertise-
ments, especially prominent in television, in which something is so obviously
played as comedy or fantasy that few if any consumers will take such adver-
tisements seriously or even think of believing them.' Undoubtedly, the
regulators decide that such advertisements involve no potential for deception
and should not be subject to prosecution. In this way, belief is considered.
Regulators also assert that puffery is not believed, and although some argue
that such decisions may be wrong, 132 they do involve judgments about belief.
While regulators consider belief in puffery or joke advertisements, they do
not apply the same standard to claims which are not explicit jokes or puffs.
In the cases used in the copytesting study,' 33 people who had additional
sources of information, such as competing advertisements or personal expe-
rience with the product, could reasonably have disbelieved the claims. The
claims, however, were presented straightforwardly, and for that reason could
be interpreted as being intended to be believed and therefore believed. In
such cases, one may reasonably doubt that regulators have considered the
possibility that a potential for belief may be absent.
Therefore, although regulators might consider belief, such consideration is
not systematic.134 This Article suggests that consideration of belief be sys-
130. American Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1360
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). The FTC found that challenged milk advertisements could damage lactase
deficient people, but it also found that such people knew of their deficiency and knew to avoid
milk. California Milk Producers, 94 F.T.C. 429, 546-47 (1979) (dismissed).
131. The author is not aware of any regulator's statement on this point, but calls it appar-
ent because such content has never been challenged. Common sense suggests the obviousness
of seeing no violation in such things as an ordinary automobile flying through the air on the
television screen.
132. Preston, Implications, supra note 32, at 1300-06 (section XX, "The Puffery
Implication").
133. Supra text accompanying note 129.
134. The potential for belief issue interacts interestingly with the definitional element of
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. See supra note 9 and accompanying
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tematic, either as the regulators' burden to show that potential for belief
does exist or as a defense. One approach is to adopt the FTC's treatment of
materiality: there could be a rebuttable presumption that conveyed claims
carry a potential for belief. If the challenged claim is conveyed, material,
either false or unsubstantiated, and is presumed to be believed, the claim
falls under the current definition. Should the claim be found without poten-
tial to be believed, however, it may have no potential to deceive. If that is
the case, then the definition of deceptiveness cannot ignore belief and still be
accurate.
If considered as an element of deceptiveness, potential for belief could be
expressed as a percentage of consumers, just as conveyance is. For example,
twenty-five percent might see the claim conveyed, but only twenty percent of
that twenty-five percent are capable of believing it. The resulting potential
for belief, therefore, would be only five percent of that twenty-five percent,
which would then be assessed against a predetermined criterion. The five
percent would probably be too insignificant to prohibit the advertisement
even if the twenty-five percent taken alone would justify a prohibition on
public interest grounds. More claims would meet a measurement threshold
under a conveyed standard than under a belief standard. Therefore, consid-
eration of belief would reduce the number of findings of deceptiveness, but
increase their accuracy.
There are a number of ways to measure the potential for belief. For spoof
advertisements that are intended to be taken as false, the regulators' appar-
ent method is simply that of looking at the advertisement alone. Extrinsic
evidence was used in American Brands, Inc. v. R. J Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 35 where the court examined the surrounding context of other media
messages that consumers could be expected to see in addition to the chal-
lenged message. 136 Although these methods will often be acceptable, the
same criticism may be offered as in other instances of relying on intrinsic
evidence or indirect extrinsic evidence.
The best solution is to ask questions directly of consumers. The copytest-
ing study 137 asked those people who reported seeing conveyed claims
text. Does acting reasonably involve what consumers reasonably see conveyed, or what they
reasonably believe about what they see conveyed? The first assumption characterizes reason-
able behavior as a perception choice, while the second characterizes it as a belief choice. Can it
be only one or must it be both? When consumers acting reasonably encounter a claim they do
not believe, do they see it as conveyed and false or do they see it as not conveyed? Such
analysis may seem merely academic, but it shows that regulators who fail to consider the
potential for belief do not evaluate deceptiveness fully.
135. 413 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
136. Id. at 1360.
137. Supra text accompanying note 129.
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whether they believed them. Although such questions can legitimately mea-
sure the general public's potential for belief, questions which probe potential
directly may be the most appropriate.
Although this is not the place to discuss the many necessary decisions on
method, three considerations concerning pertinent legal requirements should
be addressed. First, while conveyance can be measured by using consumers
of various types, because regulators assume that sheer perception is similar
for most people,1 31 the measurement of belief potential probably would not
be legitimate unless done on users or prospective users. Belief will vary con-
siderably according to differences in such things as knowledge of and previ-
ous experience with the advertised item.
Second, measuring deceptiveness legally requires evidence of the belief po-
tential of the claim specifically as conveyed in the advertisement, not as con-
veyed by other means, because evidence from other sources cannot validly
support a charge that the given communication is deceptive. Third, the su-
periority of artificial over natural research methods for determining convey-
ance is reversed for determining belief because both natural conditions and
belief involve longer term responses.'
3 9
B. Commercialness and Dissemination Could be Better Defined
On defining commercial speech, it is obvious to many, including a
Supreme Court justice, that a better job needs to be done. "[T]he Court's
opinion creates the impression that 'commercial speech' is a fairly definite
category of communication .... That impression may not be wholly war-
ranted .... [A]dvertisements may be complex mixtures of commercial and
noncommercial elements... ."' The Supreme Court's efforts to date have
not convincingly established the distinction.' 4 ' No doubt the zeal with
which advertising respondents try to avoid prosecution by arguing that their
138. Supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
139. See discussions and citations in Preston, supra note 30, at 655-56; Preston, Lanham
Act, supra note 32, at 530-32.
140. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
The Court said elsewhere that the precise bounds of commercial speech are subject to doubt.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); see also In Re Primus,
436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) (the line between speech motivated by personal commercial
interests and speech motivated by a desire to advance an association's beliefs and ideas will be
difficult to draw).
141. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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communications should be characterized as noncommercial will result in
further clarification of what constitutes commercial speech.142
No stated criterion or measurement standard exists for the extent of dis-
semination apart from the obvious assumption that some dissemination is
necessary. Given these omissions, the element of dissemination is barely
alive. The regulators might well have a rationale for keeping it that way, but
if so, an explicit statement would be helpful. Admittedly, this topic has not
been a source of disputes; nor is it likely that mass media users can success-
fully argue that their claims were not sufficiently disseminated when even
modest campaigns reach huge numbers of people. Therefore, despite the
weak treatment of this element, the results have not caused much of a
problem.
C. Conveyance Could be Better Defined
By contrast, the handling of conveyance includes many significant issues.
To begin, the idea that deceptiveness should be based on conveyed content
rather than merely explicit content, although extremely well-established and
fundamental, is nagged by certain conceptual problems. The problems are
not with the idea of conveyance per se as a criterion, because such an idea
supports the regulators' stated goal of preventing harm to consumers and
competitors. It is elementary that such harm comes from what a message
communicates rather than from what it literally contains.
The difficulties, rather, lie with unresolved questions regarding the rela-
tionship between conveyed content and explicit content. One such issue
stems from the regulators' apparent unwillingness to consider that explicit
content sometimes may not be conveyed to consumers. In some statements,
the FTC appears to argue that explicit content is always conveyed: "[iln
cases of express claims, the representation itself establishes the meaning.,
143
142. This question has provoked enough comment already that it will not be examined
further here. See Note, supra note 66; Comment, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc.: The
"Common Sense" Distinction Between Commercial and Noncommercial Speech, 14 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 869 (1987); Note, Common Sense and Commercial Speech, 48 U. PIrr. L. REV.
1121 (1987); see also Bolger, 463 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that rigid
classifications are unnecessary and stating that mixtures of commercial and non-commercial
speech are inevitable; the key is the balance between the aspects of each that are present in the
speech); R. J. Reynolds, FTC Docket No. 9206, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1277 at 219 (Aug. 7, 1986) (initial decision; dismissed on summary judgment) (cigarette manu-
facturers claimed that advertisement was an editorial comment and not commercial speech),
remanded for trial, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,522 (Apr. 11, 1988), consent, slip op. (May
22, 1989), and cases cited in both.
143. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 6, at 176.
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Elsewhere, however, the Commission recognizes that explicit content may
be insignificant or obscure and thus not be communicated. "Written disclo-
sures or fine print may be insufficient to correct a misleading representa-
tion," and "[p]ro forma statements or disclaimers may not cure otherwise
deceptive messages or practices."'" These statements lead to the overall
impression that the Commission believes an explicit representation does not
always establish its meaning."' Rather than having to rely on impression,
however, observers would be better served in both FTC Act and Lanham
Act cases by a specific understanding that explicit content is not automati-
cally conveyed, but rather that the determination of conveyance as a sepa-
rate step must be made for explicit content just as it is for implied content.'16
Another problem arising from the concept of conveyed content involves
whether it should include implications. The regulators have firmly estab-
lished that implications should be included in conveyed content. 147 Only
one recent law review article has argued to the contrary.148 Although not
yet prominent, the argument is mentioned because it may be a sleeping giant,
invoking the first amendment, which in recent years has been a potent force
for change in the handling of commercial speech.
149
As expressed by Schmidt and Bums, the argument against implications is
that advertisers face an "intolerable uncertainty" in knowing whether im-
144. Id. at 180.
145. See also Analysis, supra note 8, at 383 (an analysis of whether qualified representations
containing disclosures or disclaimers sufficiently correct a misrepresentation depends upon the
overall impression conveyed); Preston, Implications, supra note 32, at 1277-84 (sections on
"The No Qualification Implication" and "The Ineffective Qualification Implication").
146. Another minor problem is the Commission's statement that any message intended to
be conveyed will be conveyed. Policy Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 178. The result, however, is
not automatic. Thus, conveyance should be determined separately.
147. "The ultimate impression upon the mind of the reader arises from the sum total of not
only what is said but also of all that is reasonably implied." Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165,
167 (7th Cir. 1942). See generally Preston, Implications, supra note 32, at 1244-51 (FTC policy
prohibits implied representations if they are "identified by reasonable interpretation, are con-
veyed to a significant percentage of consumers, and are found material and false"). "That
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act encompasses more than literal falsehoods cannot be ques-
tioned." American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir.
1978). See generally Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 513-15 (prohibitable content may
consist of more than what is explicitly claimed, as long as the conveyed content is false with
respect to the characteristics of products).
148. Schmidt & Bums, Proof or Consequences: False Advertising and the Doctrine of Com-
mercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1273 (1988).
149. The argument is also mentioned because opposition to its acceptance has been pub-
lished by this author. Preston, Implications, supra note 32, at 1243; see also McKenzie, Ambi-
guity, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1295 (1988) (arguing




plied messages exist, and what they are. ' This uncertainty places an undue
burden on advertisers; any deceptiveness from implications should thereby
be protected by the first amendment.'51 Schmidt and Burns would prohibit
implications only when advertisers have actual knowledge of an implication,
or when advertisers should have known of an implication because of an ex-
isting trade rule stating the conditions under which an implication would
occur, or when consumer surveying showed that an implication has been
conveyed. This rule would result in far fewer prosecutions of implications
than currently occur, they say.
Nevertheless, the rule would seem to eliminate very little current prosecu-
tion because consumer research is already used frequently. 152 In Lanham
Act cases, all implied content must be supported by extrinsic evidence, of
which the best and most used is consumer surveys. 5 ' Although Schmidt
and Burns focus primarily on FTC regulation, they seem not to realize the
great extent to which implications are already identified through consumer
research in the Commission's proceedings.
More significantly, Schmidt and Bums' claim that speech will be chilled is
based in the advertisers' alleged inability to know when implications exist.
This basis does not seem accurate in light of the analyses showing that impli-
cations found in FTC Act and Lanham Act cases have occurred in a number
of distinct types having readily recognizable and predictable characteris-
tics. 154 These types were not previously evident because, although the regu-
lators obviously must assert that a message has been conveyed, their
evidentiary burden does not extend to identifying any particular kind of
message. With the identifications now available, however, advertisers can
use comparisons to learn whether current advertising content is likely to
produce one of the types of implications. Current conditions thus are very
close to Schmidt and Burns' suggestion that trade rules might be drafted
specifically to identify implications for advertisers. The case record,
although not crystal clear, seems to imply that such trade rules are probably
not necessary. There will always be some degree of open endedness because
new implications could be recognized at any time. Nevertheless, the existing
150. Schmidt & Bums, supra note 148, at 1280.
151. See id. at 1273-74. "It is our thesis that uncertainties in the federal regulation of
advertising chill legitimate commercial speech and that even some false and misleading speech
should be protected to provide breathing room for legitimate commercial speech." Id.
152. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 89-90. However, consumer research is not
always used. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
153. Supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
154. See Preston, Implications, supra note 32; Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 513-
23 (section III, "Identifying implications as Lanham Act violations").
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types undoubtedly comprise a huge proportion of all the implications likely
to be recognized in the future.1
55
Notwithstanding the reasoning against prosecuting implications, we will
assume here that the element of conveyed meaning will continue to include
such implied conveyance. In addition, the definition of deceptiveness should
be augmented to include the specific types of identifiable implications.
D. Conveyance Could be Identified as Explicit or Implied
and be Better Measured
It would be helpful if the Commission's decisions identified conveyed
claims as explicit or implied. Many recent cases distinguish between the
claims, especially when extrinsic evidence is required for hard to identify
implications. 56 When extrinsic evidence is not used, however, the decisions
may not report whether the conveyed claim was explicit or was an easy to
identify implied claim.' 57 Possibly, this omission follows from the fact that
FTC complaints routinely charge that a claim has been made "directly or by
implication."' 58 The FTC's actions understandably offer the factfinders two
ways rather than one way to find the claim, but leave readers uninformed
when cases do not resolve the matter.
Problems also exist in measuring the conveyed claim. When Commission-
ers and judges invoke their privilege to determine conveyance from the lit-
eral message alone, '59 they evaluate the conveyed claim on a measurement-
free basis which creates no direct knowledge of the conveyed claim. To rea-
son that the conveyed claims are evident in the literal message is not objec-
tionable for clear and conspicuous explicit claims. For less clear explicit
content or for implied claims, however, such an approach cannot be well
accepted. In the latter case, the regulators are open to the protest that their
"method" consists entirely or partly of seeing what they wish to see.
155. The set of types seems similar to the Table of Elements in chemistry, in which,
although the future finding of new elements may never cease, those earliest known will con-
tinue to account for most of the earth's matter. Arguably, a similar level of maturity has been
reached with implications, such that the types already identified probably represent a major
percentage of those ever to be recognized.
156. See, e.g., Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984).
157. This problem has not occurred in litigated FTC cases following the landmark discus-
sion that raised consciousness about types of evidence. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 788-
90. Such identification is not required by any published FTC rule or protocol, however, and
thus conceivably could be omitted in the future. Also, the problem continues to occur in the
many FTC consent cases for which no decisions are written.
158. See, e.g., Sun Indus., 110 F.T.C. 511, 512 (1988).
159. Supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
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Regulators are aware of such problems and use extrinsic evidence to over-
come such protests in many cases. Nevertheless, regulators might have iden-
tified incorrectly some types of implications absent extrinsic evidence.'
The same is true for the arbitrary assumptions about explicit content.
1 61
Such results suggest that data-free decisions should be made with the great-
est care and with carefully explained reasoning.
Determinations made with extrinsic evidence are superior, but they are
not without problems. FTC Commissioners and Lanham Act judges have
offered no formal guidelines about extrinsic evidence.' 62 They have com-
mented that certain measurement methods are acceptable, superior or infer-
ior to others, or unacceptable, and these comments have been examined for
the specifications they may yield. 163 The conclusions of an outside observer,
however, are not necessarily a sufficient substitute for the regulators' own
guidance. The FTC should provide guidelines, and the same should be done
for Lanham Act cases, although in the latter situation, no central organiza-
tion exists to do such a job.
An aspect of extrinsic evidence that could benefit from official guidelines is
types of survey questions. Disputes continue to occur over the relative mer-
its of open ended versus forced choice survey questions.", Other extrinsic
evidence topics that are more settled but for which disputes may still occur
include the following: sampling; coding of verbatims; protocols; the need for
control groups or control advertisements; the superiority of artificial over
natural testing conditions; evidence that may be indirectly useful (i.e., about
the product, its users, or other aspects of the context of the claim); focus
groups; the qualifications of experts; and the appropriate bases for expert
testimony.' 65 All such matters involving the collection of extrinsic evidence
160. Preston, Implications, supra note 32, at 1263, 1268, 1270, 1273, 1276, 1281, 1284,
1305 (identifies types of implications whose existence is not supported by extrinsic evidence).
161. Id at 1281, 1284 (discussing the No Qualification and Ineffective Qualification
Implications).
162. A statement was made in Bristol-Myers Co., 85 F.T.C. 688, 744 n.14 (1975), aff'd,
738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985). Standards from a Handbook
were cited in a Lanham Act case: Borden v. Kraft, No. 84-C-5295, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 811,
821 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1984). Both are old and incomplete sources.
163. See Preston, supra note 30, at 640-87; Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32, at 529-43.
164. For an FTC Act case which demonstrates strongly opposing opinions on this topic,
see Kraft, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9208 (Apr. 3, 1989) (initial decision, Commission opinion
pending). See generally Preston, supra note 30, at 656-67 (discussion of the various inadequa-
cies and structural problems of open-ended versus forced-choice questions); Preston, Lanham
Act, supra note 32, at 534-36 (same).
165. See generally Preston, supra note 30 (offering examples and evaluations of testing
methods); Preston, Lanham Act, supra note 32 (same).
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should be incorporated into the definition of deceptiveness to the extent
possible.
E. The Criterion for Conveyance Could be Better Defined
The definition of deceptiveness must also include the criterion portion of
consumers who must see the conveyed claim. The definition should identify
the criterion as a number, usually a percentage, of consumers.' 66 This asser-
tion does not mean that the definition should state a specific figure, but only
that it specify that a numerical value will be determined at the appropriate
time.
Because one can scarcely conceptualize the idea of "less than all consum-
ers" without assuming that some quantifiable portion is implied, the reader
may wonder at the obviousness of this addition. The point is made, how-
ever, because the FTC has described the prevailing definition in terms that
pointedly avoid conceding that a number can possibly be involved.' 67 Yet,
we have also seen that numbers are involved and cannot help but be in-
volved.168 Therefore, the definition should explicitly acknowledge a crite-
rion in the form of a percentage.
Further, the definition should give some indication of what the percent-
ages should be. Such figures need not be stated so precisely as to foreclose
consideration of the facts of each individual case. Rather, the definition
could acknowledge what past cases have revealed about how such figures
have been chosen. For example, because the figure is theoretically intended
to be smaller for potentially greater harms, the definition could note that a
lesser figure is required for health claims, which endanger personal health or
safety, and that a higher figure is required for non-safety related claims
where the product differed only slightly from what had been claimed.
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of that theoretical point, the case rec-
ord shows that most determinations of the criterion are made absent survey
evidence. '69 Therefore, the Commission is free to say that, in its opinion, the
claim was conveyed to a substantial number of consumers, or in recent cases,
to consumers acting reasonably, without the slightest hint as to how many
166. Although a criterion number would normally be a percentage, there might be times
when a number is appropriate such as when a small number of consumers is deemed sufficient.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46, 85.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50, 85.
169. This privilege has been considered valuable by some: "The absence of extrinsic evi-
dence about consumer expectations has never barred the Commission from making informed,
considered judgments about what consumers could reasonably be expected to believe about a
given claim." Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 384 (1983) (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting),
aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
1072 [Vol. 39:1035
Deceptiveness in Advertising
consumers saw the claim. Further, even from cases in which survey evi-
dence was present to supply percentages, 70 we cannot necessarily glean the
nature of the criterion figure. For example, if the Commission has found a
claim conveyed to twenty percent of consumers and has ruled that twenty
percent was or was not a substantial number, the Commission typically has
not hinted at what it considered the minimum substantial number.
Accordingly, a requirement that decisions specify a criterion percentage in
each individual case would improve the definition of deceptiveness. Instead
of ruling simply that the claim was conveyed to enough consumers to con-
clude that they were acting reasonably, the decision would be required to
enunciate the court's reasoning and to identify a particular minimum per-
centage that would constitute evidence that the consumers had acted reason-
ably. After a number of these decisions, observers could check the specified
percentage figures against the types of claims involved and arrive at much
better conclusions about the requisite percentages.
An analysis recently published by Schechter suggests a method for deter-
mining the criterion percentage based on how the nature of the communica-
tion determines what percentage of consumers will be "at risk." 171 While
this Article neither endorses nor opposes this method, the idea that the crite-
rion should vary is consistent with comments made herein.
F Claim Could be Considered in Context of Potential Knowledge from
Other Sources
To support their prosection of false claims even when consumers may
later find out the truth from other sources, regulators argue that some con-
sumers will never encounter those sources and thus never learn the truth.
1 72
This argument's validity may be questioned, especially when the regulators
do not use a measurement method to determine the number of consumers
who see the conveyed claim or believe it. The regulators' approach may be
acceptable if its underlying premises are accurate, but without measure-
ments, it is impossible to find facts to disconfirm the premises. In some
cases, the false claim might be conveyed in a context in which most or all
consumers already know or are certain to learn the truth. In this instance,
the claim has no potential to deceive.
170. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
171. Schechter, supra note 120, at 617; see also Russo, Metcalf & Stephens, supra note 51;
Jacoby & Small, supra note 51. Also, a method for determining the criterion percentage based
on cost-benefit analysis is offered in a forthcoming article: Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Ad-
vertising, supra note 60.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
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The potential to deceive, therefore, should be found only in situations
where a specified criterion number of consumers who see the false claim
conveyed can be found unlikely to learn the truth elsewhere. These consum-
ers should have a potential to believe the claim on the basis of the challenged
communication alone, and the unlikelihood to learn the truth elsewhere
should be established by acceptable reasoning. An alternative would be to
adopt a rebuttable presumption that the consumer is not likely to learn the
truth concerning the claim elsewhere.
G. Materiality Could be Better Defined and Measured
The current concept of the materiality element reflects regulatory concern
over whether harm to the consumer exists. Materiality properly separates
potentially harmful deceptiveness from harmless deceptiveness. The Miller
majority interpretation of materiality, however, created inconsistencies, or at
least the perception of inconsistencies, that need to be removed. Originally,
the Miller statement equated materiality with injury, and otherwise caused
confusion.173 Subsequent cases have shown a return toward the traditional
understanding that a material claim is one that has the potential to affect
consumer purchasing. 74 Even if later developments stabilize the situation,
the FTC should restate the definition.
As to measuring materiality,' 75 regulators and decision-makers have
sometimes used consumer data, but without great success. The regulators
have been even more prone to accept intrinsic evidence alone for examining
materiality than for examining conveyance. Dependence on intrinsic evi-
dence alone might be more objective and thus less controversial when exam-
ining materiality than when examining conveyance. Perhaps this explains
why defending advertisers typically offer no defense in the matter. Never-
theless, the actual criterion that determines whether a claim is material to
consumers is their own perception, which therefore might be examined more
often.
Thus, a measurement standard for materiality should allow for intrinsic
evidence as it currently does, but should also encourage and more precisely
173. Supra note 53.
174. See, e.g., Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313, 374 (1986) (Commission held that repre-
sentations about fire warning devices effectiveness were material because they were likely to
influence consumer choices), aff'd mem., 817 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1987); International Har-
vester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1057 (1984) (Commission noted that a material effect is one likely
to influence consumer conduct or purchase decision); Thompson Medical Co., 104 E.T.C. 648,
816 (1984) (Commission held that representation concerning efficacy of Aspercreme in reliev-
ing the pain of arthritis was material because it was likely to affect consumer choice), aff'd,
791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 94-104.
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specify extrinsic evidence. The standard should also make clear that extrin-
sic rebuttal evidence of consumers' actual perceptions might prevail over the
presumptions made from intrinsic evidence.
H. Truth and Substantiation are Well Defined
but Could be Better Identified
The final elements are truth or falsity and substantiation. Falsity means
that the facts conveyed about an item's features or performance are discon-
firmed by examining the item. Lack of substantiation means that the facts
are not confirmed, that is, either disconfirmed or neither confirmed nor dis-
confirmed. Failure to confirm means that the consumer may see the item
having a feature it does not have or at least is not known by the seller to
have.
Truth or falsity and substantiation are the essence of deceptiveness. When
materiality is added, the deceptiveness becomes the harmful sort in which
the consumer's likelihood of buying the product has been increased because
of the attraction of the feature that is not really present. These concepts
seem to have been handled well and do not require changes.
176
Greater strides appear to have been made with respect to measuring truth
and substantiation than anywhere else in the definition. The measurement
methods established in FTC Act and Lanham Act cases suffer from being
open ended, as is the case with measuring conveyance. Identification of such
methods, however, is much more complete than for conveyance, and pro-
vides for greater certainty.
The above is true despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that measure-
ment methods for truth and substantiation must be written more broadly or
vaguely than the standards for determining conveyance. The standards are
more broad because, whereas examining conveyance is similar for every ad-
vertisement, examining facts about the advertised item is potentially differ-
ent for every such item. Tires, for example, are tested by seeing how they
hold up under use, while no comparable durability test exists for butter or
margarine.
176. Those who find it possible that evidence could be strong enough to allow a reasonable
inference that substantiation exists, yet not strong enough to prove the claim true, may sense a
difference between finding a claim true and finding it substantiated, feeling that substantiation
connotes less knowledge. Some discussion of this point exists in FTC analyses using the term
"reasonable basis." This author's prior analysis, however, concludes that "reasonable basis"
and "substantiation" mean the same thing today, and that in practice no different measure-
ment criteria are used to find a claim false than to find it unsubstantiated. See supra note 55.
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On the other hand, one can glean generalizations about what constitutes
proper evidence from the cases and infer broad standards.1 7' As with all
other elements in the deceptiveness definition, well conceived and widely
published guidelines on truth and substantiation will improve the current
approach of requiring outsiders to infer requirements. Regulators should
promulgate formal expressions of these requirements.
V. AN AUGMENTED DEFINITION OF DECEPTIVENESS
These suggestions incorporated into the definition offered in section III
produce a new and improved version. There are first, however, some com-
ments to be made on the considerations faced in deciding whether such a
prospective definition is feasible. Some observers might not attempt at pres-
ent to improve the deceptiveness definition because certain of its elements
are unsettled. Unsettled issues include disputes over the proper characteri-
zation of some elements and uncertainties over the fundamental open ended-
ness of some elements.
To illustrate this point, we observe that when specifications about extrinsic
evidence of the conveyed meaning are drawn from cases, there are un-
resolved disputes, such as the current Kraft case's arguments about open
ended versus forced choice questions.17 Such disputes may leave us unable
to state with certainty what is acceptable or unacceptable. Such enumera-
tions also produce open ended lists which must allow for future additions.
For example, although certain kinds of samples have been identified to date,
additional kinds may be identified in the future. The likelihood of new
methods or aspects of methodology is always high, not only because various
existing methods have yet to appear in cases, but also because new methods
are continually being invented.
Incorporating these troublesome disputes and open ended features into the
definition of deceptiveness has both advantages and disadvantages. On the
positive side, doing so reflects legal requirements that must be respected.
Parties to proceedings have extensive rights in creating their own prosecu-
tions or defenses, and the introduction of a. new survey method cannot be
rejected simply because an intendedly all inclusive definition already exists
when the method becomes available.
There may be advantages to a closed definition of deceptiveness which is
based solely on measurement methods accepted without dispute in the ex-
isting case records. One significant characteristic is that any evidentiary
methods not found in the existing record would not have been acceptably
177. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
178. See supra text accompanying note 164.
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validated and would be excluded. Moreover, many measurement aspects
would have been aired thoroughly and a consensus on their value reached.
For example, artificial conditions have been found preferred over natural
conditions in survey methodology. 179 Thus, many conclusions are available
that could be incorporated.
On the negative side, however, a closed definition assures that the mea-
surement methodology assumed by law to exist will not grow over time. The
definition, therefore, will soon become less sophisticated than what is known
to the consumer research community. This detriment alone may outweigh
the benefits.
Another option is to refuse to write a definition, on the ground that the
field's open endedness makes any definition vague while its disputes make
consensus impossible. The alternative would be to continue to monitor cases
in the hope that more measurement methods would be incorporated and the
disputes eventually resolved.' 8 0 A more precise and certain definition then
could be written at a later time.
The solution chosen here is to write a definition now because a more ideal
time may never come. Of course, if written now, the definition must be open
ended and reflect any unresolved disputes. As such, it will reflect not only
what has actually been defined, but also what still needs to be defined. The
definition may be imperfect, but imperfection is no reason not to go ahead.
Thus, the augmented definition from section III is as follows:
When a claim is presented in a communication that is commer-
cial, because the communication has factors which, although need-
ing further clarification by the courts, include being paid for, and/
or being about a commercial item (even if only impliedly), and/or
discussing the attributes of that commercial item, and/or support-
ing the speaker's economic motives, and which factors, despite the
presence as well of noncommercial content, lead to a conclusion
that the communication's primary purpose is commercial;
and the communication is disseminated to consumers, to a crite-
rion amount or degree that needs to be specified and given a
rationale;
and the claim, considered within the communication taken indi-
vidually and as a whole, is identified as explicit or implicit, and if
implicit, is identified as to type of implication, and is found con-
veyed, via one of several processes, including
179. See supra text accompanying note 165.
180. For an approach to resolving disputes, see Richards & Preston, Quantitative Research:
A Dispute Resolution Process for FTC Advertising Regulation, 40 OKLA. L. REv. 593 (1987).
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(1) by FTC Commissioners or Lanham Act judges finding that
claims are made explicitly by specified reasoning based on examin-
ing the communication (intrinsic evidence); or finding through spe-
cific reasoning or factfinding that implied claims were intended to
be made, or
(2)(a) by FTC Commissioners finding that claims made impliedly
are easy to identify as such and so finding by specified reasoning
based on examining the communication (intrinsic evidence) that
such claims have been conveyed to a predetermined and justified
criterion percentage of consumers acting reasonably in the circum-
stances, or
(2)(b) by FTC Commissioners finding that claims made explicitly
or impliedly are hard to identify as such but further finding by
examining consumer response (extrinsic evidence, having charac-
teristics needing more formal specification, and subject to disputes
needing resolution, but of which theatre testing is most likely to be
probative, followed by other surveys, then by expert testimony, and
finally by infrequently used miscellaneous sources) that the claims
have been conveyed to consumers generally (i.e., without regard
for reasonable or unreasonable persons, users or nonusers, exposed
persons or nonexposed, or other types of consumers), to a predeter-
mined criterion percentage likely to be about twenty or twenty-five
percent or more but needing to be specified more precisely and jus-
tifed, the justification including a rationale for the percentage to
vary for different conditions, or
(3) by Lanham Act judges finding by similar extrinsic evidence
that implied claims have occurred for a predetermined criterion of
a not insubstantial segment likely to be about fifteen percent or
more but needing to be specified more precisely and similarly
justified;
and there is a potential for a predetermined and justified crite-
rion percentage of consumers to believe the claim, based preferably
on extrinsic evidence needing more formal specification but con-
sisting preferably of surveying under natural conditions, of con-
sumers who use or may use the advertised item, based on their
response solely to the conveyed claim;
and a predetermined substantial number of consumers seeing the
claim conveyed are unlikely to learn the truth elsewhere prior to
acting on the claim, the unlikelihood being determined at least by
reasoning or by rebuttable presumption;
and the claim is conveyed with or without evidence of intent to
deceive, and with or without evidence of actual deception;
and the claim is material, i.e., having the potential to affect con-
sumers' purchasing decisions, either by being explicitly stated, or
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intended to be conveyed impliedly, or describing impliedly even
though unintendedly the advertised item's central characteristics,
or for other reasons needing to be specified, such findings being
made at least by specified reasoning on the basis of intrinsic evi-
dence, subject to rebuttal in FTC Act cases by extrinsic evidence
according to a measurement standard needing to be specified;
and the claim is factual, as determined through reasoning or evi-
dence that it is capable of being found true or false;
and the claim is false or unsubstantiated, by being found discon-
firmed or not confirmed by the facts of the promoted item, as de-
termined by an objective observation method appropriate to the
given item, following standards that need to be specified more for-
mally but ranging from the use of any observer's unassisted sense
organs to the competent use by qualified experts of scientific mea-
surement instruments or methods generally accepted in the given
field;
and, in Lanham Act cases, the claim damages plaintiff as indi-
cated by its loss and/or defendant's gain of market share or reve-
nue, or is likely to damage plaintiff through loss of sales or
lessening of goodwill as indicated by existence of a claim giving a
false perception of the relative superiority of plaintiff's and defend-
ant's products, according to standards that need to be specified
more formally;
the claim is legally deceptive.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has stated two definitions of deceptiveness. The first, the ex-
isting definition in section III, is currently applied, although the elements
have never been previously summarized formally into a complete statement.
The purpose of stating this definition is to provide a more complete under-
standing of all aspects of the definition than has been previously available.
The second, the augmented definition in section V, incorporates additional
elements that are not currently part of the existing definition. The purpose
of stating them is to urge regulators to consider their incorporation on the
grounds that they fill gaps or inadequacies in the existing definition and rec-
oncile the definition more appropriately with existing knowledge of con-
sumer behavior.
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